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ABSTRACT
This thesis is surveys Western scholarship on the history of Russian Central Asia,
from the Russian conquest of the region in 1867 through the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991. Special emphasis is given to how Western scholars have portrayed the Russian
relationship with Islam, and to how the Islamic religion and Russian policy contributed to
the development of nationalism and national identity in Turkestan. While there have
been brief historiographical essays on scholarly trends on the topic, none have provided a
comprehensive survey of the trends which have characterized the Western scholarship on
the history of Russian Central Asia. This thesis examines those trends and understand
how they developed in the historiography of the topic.
The introduction surveys the existing historiographical scholarship on the topic
of Russian Central Asia and gives a brief overview of the history of the Russian
relationship with the Muslims of the region from the conquest until the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. Chapter One addresses how historians have portrayed Russian policy
toward the Muslims of the region. Chapter Two examines how they have portrayed the
development of Muslim nationalism in Central Asia. Chapter Three examines how
historians have portrayed the cotton economy, the Basmachi revolts, and Soviet gender
reform efforts. In the conclusion I discuss the overarching trends in the Western
scholarship on Russian Central Asia and identify the most significant gaps in our
understanding of the subject. I also offer my own conclusions as to the nature of the
Russian relationship with the Muslims of Central Asia.
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INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING A RELATIONSHIP
Since the conquest of Kazan’ in the sixteenth century, the Russian state
has had an intimate relationship with the Muslim peoples within its borders. For
the three hundred years from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, the
Tatars overwhelmingly comprised Russia’s domestic Muslim population.
However, the Russian conquest of Turkestan by 1865 brought a large and
ethnically heterogeneous new Muslim population into the Russian Empire. The
Muslims of Central Asia, culturally and economically isolated from Europe since
the dissolution of the Silk Road, presented an array of delicate policy issues to the
Tsarist and, later, Soviet authorities. At the time of the conquest of Central Asia,
policy toward the Muslims of the region was not on the top tier of St. Petersburg’s
domestic or foreign policy concerns. However, the central government in St.
Petersburg, and later Moscow, would soon find that the symbiosis between
religion and identity in Central Asia presented complex and durable challenges to
Russian authority.
I. Previous Historiographical Surveys
The relationship between Russia and the Muslims of the Tsarist and Soviet
empires has attracted a great deal of attention from Western academics. The
purpose of this thesis is to survey the major trends in the scholarly treatment of
this relationship. These historiographical trends have been analyzed before, but
only minimally. In 1959, Serge Zenkovsky published an article in The Russian

Review titled “American Research on Russia’s Moslems.”1 At that time, the
Russian relationship with Islam was a relatively new area of historical study.
Nineteenth-century and pre-World War Two American accounts of the Russian
relationship with Islam were written primarily by travelers and diplomats rather
than by specialists. America’s World War Two alliance with the Soviet Union
allowed some scholars access to the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union, but the
wartime-era sense of solidarity with the Soviets skewed their scholarly credibility
on the subject. Zenkovsky finds that it was not until the early 1950s that
historians began to seriously evaluate the Russian role in Central Asia.2 He
concludes that by 1959, American scholars had produced a credible body of work
on “this young and heretofore unexplored sector of Russian history.”3
The most recent historiographical surveys on the subject have been written
by Adeeb Khalid, himself a significant contributor to the field. In an essay
published in Slavic Review, Khalid agrees with historians who would characterize
the Tsarist empire in Central Asia as a colonial state. However, he sees a sharp
and fundamental break in the nature of Tsarist and Soviet rule where many other
historians do not. According to him, failure to acknowledge this break leads to an
inability to accurately understand either approach. He writes that,
in terms of both the scope and the nature of state action, the Soviet
remaking of Central Asia makes sense only as the work of a
different form of modern polity… The differences between these
colonial empires and modern mobilizational states are substantial

1

Serge Zenkovsky, “American Research on Russia’s Moslems,” Russian Review 18 (July 1959):
199-217.
2
Ibid., 201.
3
Ibid., 217.

2

and confusing the two leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of
modern history.4
Khalid argues that the type of governance and social transformation attempted by
the Soviets is more comparable to the reforms attempted in the early Turkish
Republic. He explains that while the Soviet and the Kemalist states had much of
the developmental and intellectual “baggage” of European colonial states, they
did not utilize it in the same way. In his view, both states “had at their disposal
the baggage, common to modern European thought, of evolution, of
backwardness and progress,… But it matters a great deal whether that baggage is
deployed to exclude people from politics or to force their entry into it, whether it
is used to assert inequalities or to preach world revolution.”5
In another essay Khalid reviews six recent books on the place of Central
Asia and Islam in the early Soviet Union. The essay aims to understand what
these books contribute to the scholarly understanding of the imperial nature of
Soviet rule.6 The central point of difference among the books, he finds, is their
attitude towards colonialism, with the six authors representing a broad spectrum
of opinion on the subject, from those seeing clear and unbroken continuity from
the Tsarist era to those who perceive the Soviets as following a fundamentally
different approach toward governing a foreign land and people.7
Apart from the contributions of Zenkovsky and Khalid, research on the
western historiography of the Russian relationship with Central Asian Islam has
4

Adeeb Khalid, “Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in
Comparative Perspective,” Slavic Review 65 (Summer 2006): 232.
5
Ibid., 251.
6
Adeeb Khalid, “Between Empire and Revolution: New Work on Soviet Central Asia,” Kritika:
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7 (Fall 2006): 865-884.
7
Ibid., 883-884.
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been largely limited to brief essays in the introductions to books on some aspect
of that relationship. These essays tend to analyze the historiography of a specific
and limited period, such as the formation of the Soviet Union. No scholar has
identified and analyzed the intellectual trends which have characterized the broad
scope of the Russian relationship with Central Asian Islam in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. This thesis aims to fill that void.

II. Overview of the Thesis
This historiographical survey examines the Western scholarship written or
translated into English on the modern Russian relationship with Central Asian
Islam from three perspectives, each examined in its own chapter. The thesis will
also address historical works on the Tatars, but only insofar as they influence or
shed light on Central Asia. Chapter One examines how historians and other
scholars have characterized Russian policy toward the region. The focus of this
chapter is on how historians have portrayed the motivations and intent of Russian
policy toward the Muslims of Central Asia. It further addresses how scholars
gauge the degree of political autonomy which the Muslims of Central Asia may or
may not have had under the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. The major scholarly
debates examined in this chapter include the Tsarist policy of nonintervention, the
Soviet policy of korenizatsiia (indigenization), and the idea of a “divide and rule”
Soviet nationality strategy. “Nonintervention” refers to the stated Tsarist policy
of minimal interference in Muslim institutions and societies. This thesis, long
accepted by historians of Tsarist Turkestan, has recently been challenged and
come under scrutiny from historians arguing that the Tsarist administrators in fact
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had a much more active policy toward Central Asian societies and institutions
than their official statements would indicate.8 The term korenizatsiia refers to the
Soviet policy of promoting ethnic particularism among the Muslims of Central
Asia and the other non-Russian ethnicities of the Soviet Union. The scholarly
debate regarding korenizatsiia has centered on the degree to which the Soviets
actually intended to foster the creation of distinct Muslim nationalities versus the
opposing goal of creating the “new Soviet man.” 9 Perhaps none of these debates,
however, has been as vigorous or contentious as the debate over the idea of a
Soviet “divide-and-rule” strategy of nationality management. The divide-and-rule
thesis holds that the early Bolsheviks, in a cynical scheme to create reliance on
Soviet power, deliberately highlighted ethnic differences among the peoples of
Central Asia and elsewhere in order to create a state of constant ethnic tensions.
At the core of the debates over korenizatsiia and the divide-and-rule thesis is the
subject of imperialism. The degree to which the Soviet Union did or did not
remain an imperial state has been the subject of a vigorous and politically
contentious exchange among historians of modern Russia. In Chapter One I will
examine how the scholarly argument over the idea of Russian imperialism has
developed and attempt to identify how it has affected larger trends in Slavic and
Muslim historiography.
Instead of focusing on scholarly treatments of Russian policy, Chapter
Two examines historians’ positions on how those policies actually affected
8

This idea is the central thesis of Robert Crews’ For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in
Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
9
The most thorough study to date on korenizatsiia has been Terry Martin’s The Affirmative Action
Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2001).
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Muslim societies in Central Asia and Tatarstan, in particular the question of
Muslim nationalism. Here, I propose that the Western perception of Muslim
nationalism dominates histories of Islamic societies in the Tsarist and Soviet
empires, and Chapter Two examines how western historians have portrayed it. I
propose in this chapter that the western perception of Muslim nationalism can best
be understood through a matrix of people, faith, and progress. Historians have
reached a broad consensus that these three elements were the essential ingredients
of Muslim nationalism in the history of the Tsarist and Soviet empires. “People”
refers to the idea that common ethnic and cultural bonds are the necessary
foundations of a modern nation. “Faith” relates to the Central Asia’s common
identity with the Islamic religion, which further unified them politically and
strengthened notions that they should not be ruled by non-Muslims, be they
Orthodox Christians or atheists. Finally, “progress” references the popular notion
that social, economic, and even cultural progress was a necessary component of
the development of Muslim nationalism in modern Russia. These are all
important trends in the historiography of Muslim nationalism in Russia and in the
broader understanding of nationalism in different regions of the world.
The third and final substantive chapter of this thesis will examine how
western historians have portrayed three of the more significant recent foci of
conflicts between Russian power and Muslim societies: cotton, the Basmachi
revolts, and gender. For much of the nineteenth and throughout the twentieth
century, cotton was the leading cash crop for much of Central Asia. While
cultivation of the fiber was widespread before the Russian conquest, it increased
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significantly afterwards. By actively promoting and, in some cases, demanding,
the cultivation of cotton in Central Asia, the Tsarist authorities introduced
capitalism into the region and fundamentally altered the way of life there. Cotton
cultivation continued to expand during the Soviet period, to the point of
effectively draining the Aral Sea in order to expand irrigation for the water-thirsty
crop. The story of cotton cultivation in Central Asia provides historians with a
case study with which to understand the economic relationship between the
Russians and the Muslim peoples in their domain. The cotton economy is also
closely related to the broader debate over the imperial nature of Soviet rule.
Soviet gender policy also had imperial implications, but in a cultural and
social as opposed to an economic sense. In the late 1920s, Soviet authorities
initiated a campaign in Central Asia to raise the status of Muslim women and
destroy what they perceived as the misogynistic, patriarchal institutions in
Muslim society. These activists perceived Muslim women’s veil as being
symbolic of feminine seclusion and oppression. Thus, the fight against the veil
became the most public component of the larger Soviet campaign for gender
equality.

The history of Soviet gender policy is related to the larger controversy

over the imperial nature of Soviet rule in that it can be portrayed as an example of
a foreign power imposing its purported cultural values onto a subjugated society.
But historians have alternately portrayed the gender equality initiatives of the
1920s and 1930s as a case study in the limits of Soviet power, an example of
indigenous Muslim cultural reform as well as story of women’s personal
endurance.

7

While there is a wealth of scholarship on gender reform and the cotton
economy, there has been comparatively little on the Basmachi revolts. Originally
inspired by ill-advised Tsarist policy in Central Asia, the revolts eventually
became the most serious threat to Soviet power in the region during the formative
years of the Soviet Union. The Basmachi rebellion has been variously portrayed
by Soviet historians, many of whom strove to portray the revolt as a brigand,
criminal uprising instead of a genuine expression of resentment to foreign rule.
In Chapter Three I argue that the decentralized, fractious nature of the rebellion
has caused Western historians to inaccurately diminish the movement’s relevance.
III. The Russian Relationship with Muslim Central Asia, 1867-1991
Before delving into the historiography of this subject, some background
information is necessary. Located in the geographical center of the Eurasian
landmass, Central Asia has been subject to conquest and invasion from both
eastern and western powers since the time of Alexander the Great. The region is
environmentally and geographically disjointed, spanning the deserts of modernday Turkmenistan, the mountains of Kyrgyzstan, and the steppe of Kazakhstan.
The region is bordered on the west by the Caspian Sea and on the east by the
Tian-Shan mountains. The Aral Sea, a once-great inland body of water located in
modern-day Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, is now largely drained as a result of a
half-century of ecologically disastrous Soviet irrigation schemes.
Apart from the invasions of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and
Tamerlane, Central Asia enjoyed a period of importance during the Renaissance
as a major segment of the Silk Road. The Silk Road was not so much a road as a
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general route through which merchants ferried goods between Asia and Europe.
However, the road lost its previous importance for international trade with the
discovery of quicker and more cost-effective maritime routes across Eurasia.
Central Asia nevertheless remained important for Russia, both as a strategic
buffer and an economic trading partner. During the eighteenth century, Russian
settlers began moving into what is today northern Kazakhstan.
The reasons and motivations for Russia’s conquest of Central Asia in the
nineteenth century will be a major theme in this thesis. There were both
economic and strategic incentives to the Russian expansion. In the midnineteenth century, Russia’s rapidly growing textile industry was largely
dependent on imports of American, Egyptian, and Central Asian cotton.
However, the American and Egyptian sources were unreliable, as highlighted by
the gross shortage caused by the blockade of Confederate ports in the American
Civil War (1861-1865). The need for a reliable domestic source of cotton was
likely one of the major considerations in the Russian decision to conquer Central
Asia. However, there were strategic and political motivations as well, the most
significant of which was the rapidly expanding British influence in the region.
The conquest of Central Asia would give Russia a strategic buffer against British
expansionism in the geopolitical contest that would become known as the “Great
Game.”10
The conquest of Central Asia was not a single, cohesive military invasion
but rather a series of seizures, sieges, and raids. The subjugation of the khanates
10

The idea that Russia’s conquest of the region was motivated by a variety of factors is argued in
Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).
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of Bukhara and Khiva, two formerly powerful Central Asian political entities,
were probably the clearest indicator of Russian dominance in the region. After
the Russians had achieved a satisfactory degree of military control in the region in
the late 1860s, they focused their efforts on consolidating their gains. Konstantin
von Kaufmann, the first Governor-General of Turkestan, directed this process.
Towards Islam and Central Asian institutions in general, von Kaufmann professed
to follow a strategy of non-intervention, meaning that it was his policy to interfere
with Central Asian society as little and as rarely as possible while still
maintaining security and free trade. How much von Kaufmann actually adhered
to the policy of non-intervention is the subject of a current scholarly debate, one
which will be examined in this thesis.
Consolidating power in Central Asia involved improving its infrastructure.
The construction of irrigation systems created more arable land for the cultivation
of cotton and other cash crops for export to Russia. Improving infrastructure also
meant the construction of railroads between the major cities in the region. The
construction of the Trans-Caspian Railroad was perhaps the most significant
single infrastructure development in Central Asia during the Tsarist era. It
provided a vital communication and economic link between Russia and Central
Asia and solidified Russia’s control of the region.11
It is important to note that Tsarist policy towards the Kazakh steppe was
dramatically different from that in inner Central Asia, or modern-day Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan. While the steppe climate and terrain saved the Kazakhs from
the introduction of the cotton economy, their way of life was disrupted in the
11

The significance of the railroad is emphasized in ibid., 175.
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nineteenth century by large numbers of Russian settlers moving to the steppes in
search of abundant, arable land. The routes along which Kazakhs would graze
their herds were disrupted by settlers who claimed large tracts of the steppe as
their own farmland. Land rights inevitably became one of the primary focuses of
conflict between the Kazakhs and Russian settlers, igniting revolts and banditry.
Despite the widespread discontent among both the Kazakhs and the other
peoples of Central Asia around the turn of the century, they did not take an active
role in the Revolution of 1905. However, the revolution did provide a degree of
stimulus to the burgeoning nationalist movements of Central Asia.12 The Tatar
Jadid reformers flourished during this period with a program of promoting a
modern Muslim society guided by the traditional tenets of Islam. The Bolshevik
Revolution, while initiated in Russia, had disastrous implications in Central Asia.
The Russian Civil War quickly spread into the region, precipitating violence and
famine. Having been converted into a near-absolute “cotton economy,” the
people of Central Asia had been forced to forego grain production. When the
Civil War disrupted grain shipments from other parts of the Empire, Central Asia
was faced with a critical food shortage.13 Nomadic tribal groups aligned
themselves with either Bolshevik or White Russian forces, with instances of these
groups defecting more than once to opposing sides.
In the years during and immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution,
the Muslims of the newly-formed Soviet Union enjoyed a brief period of
courtship from Soviet authorities hoping to gain their support and sympathies.
12

Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, trans. Alfred Clayton (Essex:
Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 234-236.
13
Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 170.
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The Bolsheviks suspended their advocacy of atheism and appealed to the
Muslims’ sense of a right to national self-determination.14 These concessions did
not last long after the Bolshevik victory was secure, however, and Soviet
authorities soon began challenging various aspects of the Islamic faith and
culture. This involved a widespread anti-religious propaganda campaign as well
as a concerted effort to close mosques. The most contentious Soviet initiative
among the Muslims of Central Asia, however, was gender reform. Beginning in
the late 1920s, Soviet authorities sought to raise and transform the status of
Muslim women. Gender equality, an important tenet of communist social
doctrine, was noticeably absent in Central Asia, perhaps most visually so in the
persistence of the veil. The Soviet fight against female veiling and seclusion in
Central Asia during the 1920s and 1930s was one of the first large-scale conflicts
between Soviet power and Muslim societies.15
The Great Purge of 1936-38 was the next large-scale conflict, and Central
Asian Muslims, like members of other ethnic and religious minority groups,
suffered heavily. Many prominent Muslim communists and intellectuals were
arrested and killed, imprisoned, or exiled on false charges of advocating separatist
nationalism. During the Second World War the Soviet regime again backed off of
the program of active persecution of the Islam to rally maximum support for the

14

Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, “Civil War and New Governments,” in Edward Allworth, ed.,
Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance: A Historical Overview, 3rd Edition (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994), 235-247.
15
The two most significant books on this subject are Gregory Massell’s The Surrogate
Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) and Douglas Northrop’s Veiled Empire: Gender and
Power in Stalinist Central Asia, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
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war effort against the Germans. Shortly after the war ended re-Stalinization
affected Central Asia as well as the rest of the Soviet Union.
Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 and the ascendancy of Nikita Khrushchev
brought some relief to the Muslims in the form of allowing a modicum of
religious expression. However, this relief was soon overshadowed by illconceived agricultural reforms and the disastrous decision to divert the rivers
feeding the Aral Sea for irrigation, the consequences of which are still felt in
modern-day Uzbekistan. The eighteen-year tenure of Leonid Brezhnev (19641982) witnessed the gradual decay of much of Central Asia’s infrastructure and
the gradual growth of nationalist sentiment among the Muslims of Central Asia.
After the brief reigns of Yuri Andropov (1982-1984) and Konstantin
Chernenko (1984-1985), Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost allowed for the
freer expression of these ideas and ideologies. Some scholars erroneously
predicted that Muslims’ nationalist ambitions would cause a major upheaval in
the Soviet Union in the last decade of the twentieth century. However, as was the
case in the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions, the Muslims of Central Asia played a
relatively minor role in the final collapse of the Soviet Union. The governments
of the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) in Central Asia reluctantly declared their
independence after it became clear that the Soviet Union was dead, bringing to an
end one chapter in the continuing story of Russia’s enigmatic relationship with
Islam. How historians have written that chapter is another theme of this thesis

13
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CHAPTER ONE
PRAGMATIC IMPERIALISM: THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF RUSSIAN
POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS
Russia has maintained political relations with Muslims in its realm since
the conquest of Kazan in the sixteenth century. From then until the eighteenth
century, relations with the Volga and Crimean Tatars constituted the bulk of
Russian political interaction with adherents of Islam. The conquest of the
Caucasus had a significant impact on Russian culture. Nevertheless, the
subjugation of Central Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century brought
Muslim affairs once again to the forefront of Tsarist imperial policy. Central
Asia’s geographical position on the periphery of the Russian empire, its economic
potential, and its almost uniformly Muslim population compelled St. Petersburg to
formulate a comprehensive approach to managing its political relationship with
this region and its people. In the early stages of Russian involvement in Central
Asia, politics were often closely wedded to military advances and developments.
But the more enduring relationship between Russia and its Muslims was
characterized in large part by political power-sharing arrangements during both
the Tsarist and Soviet eras. The degree to which Muslims of the Russian empire
were politically autonomous in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is an issue
which historians have worked hard to gauge.
This chapter will review historical scholarship on the Russian political
relationship with Muslims of the empire. With some notable exceptions, most

accounts of Islam in the Russian empire published before the 1950’s were written
by diplomats and travelers with little scholarly background. However, after the
Second World War the Russian relationship with Islam became a major area of
historical study for western scholars. Over the past sixty years, the most durable
conclusion of this scholarship has involved the concept of pragmatic imperialism.
This holds that Russian policy toward Islam was not guided by faith or ideology,
but was made in the context of the central government’s greater domestic and
foreign policy goals. Accounts of the second half of the nineteenth century
portray a Tsarist regime trying to maximize political and economic domination of
Muslim regions while minimizing the resources devoted to their management.
Histories of the early Soviet and Stalinist periods focus on the question of whether
the early Soviet Union remained a colonialist power on the model of the Tsarist
government. Histories of the post-World War II Soviet Union examine the
destabilizing effect of Islam and Moscow’s various attempts to counter it and
preserve the political unity of the USSR.
I. Muslim Politics in Tsarist Russia, 1867-1917
Most studies of nineteenth-century Russian Islam address the origins of
the Russian domination of Central Asia. With the conquest of that region,
Muslims became the largest ethnic and religious minority in the Russian empire,
and Islam became a major domestic policy issue for the Tsarist government. The
standard account of Russian policy in Central Asia during this period is Richard
Pierce’s Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (1960).
Pierce’s central thesis on the imperial governance of Muslim Central Asia is that
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the relative peace earned from native co-operation was made possible by military
subjugation. Russian authorities were able to complete worthwhile industrial- and
agricultural-development projects in Central Asia because of the dominance they
established during the initial conquest. In his first chapter, Pierce concludes: “The
might exhibited in the Russian military operations, which planted the impression
of absolute mastery in the minds of the Central Asians, laid the groundwork for
subsequent rule.”1 Pierce offers numerous examples of the application of this
strategy to Russian political dealings with Muslims in Central Asian. He
mentions how, after the final Russian subjugation of Bukhara, Russian GovernorGeneral, Konstantin von Kaufmann, refused to allow the defeated emir to
abdicate, rationalizing that “it was deemed important for Russia to have in
Bukhara a ruler who had learned to recognize Russian supremacy and who had
lost all taste for further hostilities.”2
Pierce offers three primary reasons for the Russian advance into the
region: Russia’s historically unstable, sometimes violent relationship with the
Kazakhs to the south of its Siberian territory; the lure of agriculturally rich, arable
lands on the Kazakh steppe; and Russian fears of a growing British political and
military presence moving north from India.3 Russia’s trouble with the Kazakhs
was perhaps the most politically palatable motivation for expansion and was,
predictably, the one which St. Petersburg presented to the international
community. Pierce cites a Russian diplomat as explaining that Russia was

1

Richard Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1960), 45.
2
Ibid., 27.
3
Ibid.,17-18.
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expanding its borders for much the same reason that other great powers of the
time were expanding theirs – namely, out of the need to “advance until they could
establish secure frontiers.”4 Accepting this explanation for the venture into
Central Asia essentially justifies Russian imperial expansionism ad infinitum
since, obviously, each conquest required further expansion in order to secure what
was just taken. Eventually the empire would become too large and unwieldy to
effectively administer so, after the initial conquest of Central Asia, Tsarist
officials in St. Petersburg directed their military commanders in Turkestan to
cease further expansion and to focus on consolidating and securing the gains
already made.5 How they proceeded with the consolidation of power in Central
Asia would form the character of the Russian administration of the region.
Considering the generally negative connotations associated with the term
“colonial,” it is significant to note that Pierce does not roundly condemn the
Tsarist conquest of Central Asia. In the conclusion to his book, he finds that
Russia’s various economic, strategic, and moral motivations for conquering
Central Asia, “although not valid today, were adequate enough reasons” in the
mid-nineteenth century.6 Pierce argues that Russian policy in the region, while
generally inspired by national self-interest, nevertheless included an element of
altruism. Pierce offers the abolition of Central Asian slavery as a policy that
“served no practical end for Russia, but expressed humanitarianism and
consciousness of the responsibility to be borne.”7 Pierce concludes that,

4

Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 21.
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Ibid., 302.
7
Ibid., 303.
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regardless of St. Petersburg’s specific motivations, the Russian conquest of
Central Asia had a dual effect on Central Asian Muslims: they gained modernity,
but lost their freedom.8
The other standard narrative of Russia’s political and military conquest of
Central Asia is Seymour Becker’s Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia:
Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924, published in 1968. Becker’s book draws
primarily on original Russian archival sources and is often cited as a useful work
on the early Russian involvement in Central Asia. Rather than chronicling the
story of the Russian conquest of the whole of Turkestan, Becker focuses on Khiva
and Bukhara, two regional powers situated in modern-day Uzbekistan. He
follows the development of Russia’s influence in these emirates from the Russian
conquest until after the October Revolution. Like Pierce, Becker focuses more on
the political and economic situation in the region than on cultural or religious
matters.
Also similar to Pierce, the first major issue which Becker addresses is the
question of Russia’s motivations for its involvement in Central Asia. He makes
the point that throughout its history, Russia had never been entirely disengaged
from Central Asia, though the degree of that engagement increased substantially
in the mid-nineteenth century. Regarding the scholarly historiography on the
subject, Becker notes that he is somewhat at odds with the majority of Soviet
historians of Central Asia. Up through 1968, there was a general consensus
among Soviet historians that Tsarist Russia conquered Central Asia for purely

8

Ibid., 306.
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economic gain.9 This consensus was inspired in part at least by the fact that it is
very much in line with Marxist/Leninist theories on the role of economic forces in
history. Becker writes that available archival evidence indicates that economic
incentives were of little importance to military commanders and civilian policy
makers. He argues instead that Russia became engaged in Central Asia for a
variety of political and strategic reasons.
As a political narrative, one of the central themes in Becker’s book is the
policy of “nonintervention.” This term refers to the Russian strategy of allowing
indigenous rulers and institutions to continue to govern most of the local and
provincial affairs of Russian Central Asia, similar to contemporaneous British
policies in India and Egypt. Such a policy would lessen the economic and
administrative burdens for the Russians while presumably promoting stability in
the region by not giving the overt appearance of foreign rule. Becker’s book
follows the process by which the Tsarist government adopted, revised, and finally
abandoned nonintervention. He holds that the demise of this policy was
paralleled by a corresponding decay of Bukharan and Khivan sovereignty. The
Tsarist state only abandoned nonintervention around the turn of the century when
it became clear that indigenous leaders could not deliver the stability and security
which was the policy’s goal.10
Although Alexandre Bennigsen does not examine the subject nearly as
thoroughly as do Pierce or Becker, his general portrayal of Tsarist Central Asia is
largely similar.
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various aspects of the relationship between Islam and the Soviet state from 1917
until the mid-1960s. The section on the Tsarist era exists largely to provide
background and context for his discussion of the Soviet Union. Bennigsen holds
that Russian officials were largely unconcerned with the day-to-day functioning
of Central Asian society: “Russian authorities… abstained from interfering in the
internal affairs of the country, and contented themselves with maintaining law and
order.”11
In contrast with Becker and Bennigsen, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse
suggests a largely economic interpretation for Russia’s involvement in Central
Asia. Her book Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central
Asia (1966) is an examination of social and political trends in Central Asia from
the Russian conquest in 1867 until 1924. Carrère d’Encausse examines the
interplay of nationalism, native reform movements, and the Bolshevik revolution
in nineteenth and early twentieth-century Central Asia. She suggests that the
introduction of Russian capitalism to Bukharan society was a profoundly
consequential development that had marked social and political ramifications,
namely that it destroyed Bukhara’s customary agrarian-based society. The title of
her second chapter, “The Russian Conquest: Bukhara Face-to-Face with
Capitalism and the West” suggests a conflict that was economic and social as well
as military and political.12 Carrère d’Encausse also discusses at length what she
identifies as the development of a more class-stratified Bukharan social structure
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in the wake of the Russian conquest. The section on this topic is titled “The
Social Consequences of Capitalist Penetration,” and in it she emphasizes the
destructive social impact that the Russian financial system had on Bukharan
society.13 More significant, however, is her discussion of the development of a
national bourgeois elite. She writes that “the appearance of capitalism in Bukhara
brought with it a tragic crisis for the peasantry…, there was a corollary social
phenomenon: the development and consolidation of a national bourgeoisie.”14
This purported tragic crisis disrupted the traditionally agrarian lifestyle of rural
Bukharans and caused them to become a disenfranchised group in their own land.
Carrère d’Encausse further develops this idea, adding a dimension of ethnic
conflict to her analysis, writing that “as it developed and its resources increased,
this commercial bourgeoisie – which depended directly on Russian capitalism –
gradually thought of playing an economic role of its own; however, it then
discovered the disadvantages of Russian competition.”15 While it does not
necessarily negate the validity of her analysis, it seems clear that Carrère
d’Encausse’s understanding of nineteenth-century Central Asia is at least in part
influenced by theories of class struggle and capitalist development. This portrayal
is consistent with her interpretation of the development of Muslim national
identity, which will be examined in a later chapter.
In another essay, titled “Systematic Conquest, 1865-1884,” Carrère
d’Encausse traces the series of political and military maneuvers that resulted in
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the first stage of the Russian conquest of Central Asia.16 Like many other
scholars of Central Asia, Carrère d’Encausse argues that the Russian conquest of
Turkestan was not defined by a single, climactic event but rather a methodical
and, as the title of her essay describes, systematic effort on the part of the Tsarist
government. In an interpretation slightly different from that argued in her book
Islam and the Russian Empire, she concludes that the impetus for the Russian
conquest of Central Asia may not have been entirely economic. Quoting a former
Tsarist attaché to London, she suggests that the primary motivation for the
Russian incursion may have been that Central Asia was the only place where
Tsarist Russia could successfully check British imperial power.17 In another
article she discusses the Tsarist policy toward Islam and the various Central Asian
khans. She describes a Russian government that delegated most day-to-day
governmental functions to native authorities. She explains that the “Russian
intervention in local institutions was then very limited. For a long time the local
and the Russian hierarchies coexisted with very loose ties.”18
The idea of the Russians trying to limit their direct involvement in Central
Asian affairs as much as possible while still maintaining their dominance forms
the core of Carrère d’Encausse’s interpretation of the early years of the Russian
presence in Central Asia. Since the influence of Islam and local rulers was
different on the Kazakh steppe from what it was further south in Kokand and
Bukhara, Russian authorities administered these areas differently. Nevertheless,
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Carrère d’Encausse argues that Russian policy toward Central Asia in the
nineteenth century was remarkably consistent. She summarizes her thesis in the
middle of her essay on the political organization and administration of the region,
writing that “the political organization of Central Asia was based on one definite
principle: Manage the population without interfering in its affairs; above all,
render the machinery of colonial domination progressively lighter and less
costly.”19
Carrère d’Encausse is highly critical of General von Kaufmann during this
period for approaching Islam with a strategy of neglect. She writes that “the rule
to which von Kaufmann remained faithful all his life, (was that) he ignored Islam.
He had a clear presentiment that Islam was the force around which the conquered
people might unite, and he knew that the peace of the region was but relative.”20
The figure of von Kaufmann in this period has been subjected to varying
interpretations. Carrère d’Encausse portrays him in an overwhelmingly negative
light, focusing on his neglect of Islam and his unwillingness to confront
corruption among various Russian officials in Central Asia. She holds that
although von Kaufmann made a concerted attempt at political and administrative
reform in Central Asia, these efforts failed because of his reluctance to punish or
dismiss corrupt Russian officials with whom he was well-connected. She writes
that “when the Russian government took a hand in supervising local
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appointments, the system deteriorated. Men were chosen by virtue of their links
with the Russian authorities and their alleged influence with them.”21
Pierce echoes this portrayal of von Kaufmann at the beginning of his
chapter on “Administrative Reform and Development” in Central Asia. He
presents an inept leader who was hardly aware of the criminality of his
subordinates and associates:
Although the glaring defects in the Russian administration in
Central Asia were evident, at first little could be done to improve
the situation because of the obstacles von Kaufmann himself
interposed. Loyal to those he considered to be his friends almost
to the point of naiveté, he habitually overlooked all but the most
insistent reports of wrongdoing.22
While historians have criticized von Kaufmann’s corruption and nepotism,
his strategy of neglect has become the central feature of his historical legacy.
However, this legacy is not unanimously accepted, nor is the idea that the
Imperial Russian relationship with Islam in general was characterized by noninterference. The non-interference thesis has been subject to a series of recent
challenges, most thoroughly articulated by Robert Crews in his book For Prophet
and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (2006). In the book,
Crews challenges the idea that the history of Russia and Islam is a reflection of a
grand East/West “clash of civilizations.”23 Instead, he argues that both the
Russian state and Muslim religious leaders exploited each others’ unique
authority to secure their respective interests.24 He presents the idea that the
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relationship between Tsarist Russia and Islam was neither one of repression nor of
neglect, but rather of mutually strengthening political and social relationships. If
this argument is accepted, it bestows upon von Kaufmann and the other Tsarist
authorities a more positive and enviable legacy. Instead of being incompetent and
neglectful military bureaucrats, they become shrewd and pragmatic rulers, aware
of the limits to their power and able to utilize indigenous institutions to achieve
their goals of political stability and economic prosperity.
In Chapter Five of his book, Crews explains how this relationship shaped
the Russian conquest and consolidation of Central Asia. In a historiographical
discussion of the topic, he notes that Soviet as well as Western scholarship has
stressed projects and initiatives which originated in and were directed by
Moscow, and has portrayed Islam as “the chief impediment to the imperial
integration of Central Asia.”25 He asserts that historians to date have been too
accepting of the Tsarist authorities’ attestations of non-interference. “Despite
public pledges of non-interference,” he writes, “Russian officials recognized that
to hold their territory in Asia they needed an Islam policy.”26 This policy, Crews
argues, was to use religious institutions as a means of consolidating and securing
state control. Local religious leaders, in turn, used imperial institutions to more
completely impose and enforce Islamic religious values. This newly-exploitable
source of authority affected reforms within the Islamic religion itself. “The
Russian approach to Islam served as a catalyst for religious change,” Crews
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explains, “not apart from imperial institutions but squarely within them.”27
Imperial Russian judicial and administrative institutions became forums for
resolving religious disputes and preserving the moral fabric of Islamic society.
He argues that this intimate relationship between Islam and Imperial Russian
institutions bolstered and solidified the power of Muslim religious leaders. He
further explains that, in the eyes of the local religious establishment “the tsarist
state remained the indispensable fountain of a just moral order, and thus of the
authority of the men of religion.”28
Those historians who do ascribe to the non-interference thesis tend to
balance von Kaufmann’s corruption and nepotism with his record of developing
the physical infrastructure of Central Asia. The construction of the Trans-Caspian
Railroad was arguably the most significant Central Asian infrastructure
development project to be undertaken by the Tsarist authorities. Historians of the
region have reached a general consensus that the Trans-Caspian Railroad, also
known as the Central Asian Railroad, was one of the main instruments of building
Russian influence in Central Asia. Carrère d’Encausse’s section on “Capitalist
Penetration” emphasizes the impact that the Russian Trans-Caspian Railroad had
on the economy of the region.29 The railroad “profoundly altered the entire
economic life of Central Asia” and was, in her view, one of the primary tools the
Russians used in opening Central Asia to capitalist penetration.30 Becker also
emphasizes the impact of the railroad, writing that “the catalyst of change, the

27

Ibid.
Ibid., 291.
29
Carrère d’Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire, 39.
30
Ibid.
28

27

Central Asian Railroad, was the most important development in the region since
the Russian conquest.”31 In an essay in Allworth’s Central Asia: A Century of
Russian Rule, Ian Murray Matley also emphasizes the development of a rail
transportation system in Central Asia, writing that “there is no doubt that the
greatest Russian impact on the traditional economy of Central Asia was in
transportation.” He continues to emphasize that the railroad allowed the Russians
to develop Central Asia into a cotton-based economy and a new market for
Russian manufactured goods.32 Pierce acknowledges the impact of the railroad,
but discusses its limitations as well, namely that much freight still had to be
shipped across the Caspian Sea.33 Pierce, furthermore, sees the railroad as a
vessel for the transit of ideas into Central Asia. In his chapter on the Revolution
of 1905, Pierce mentions that the railroad “provided a ready avenue for the spread
of revolutionary ideas.”34 In his portrayal, therefore, the railroad becomes another
example of a Russian-initiated and Russian-financed effort, such as the Central
Asian public education system, in which the Tsarist state contributed to nurturing
the social trends which would contribute to its own collapse.
The construction of the Central Asian Railroad was a large component of
the overall economic development of the region. Various historians have
suggested that Russia’s motivations for becoming involved in Central Asia were
primarily economic. Becker notes that, regardless of whether or not this
interpretation is accurate, there was a large gulf between Russia’s economic
31
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intentions and its actual impact.35 The greatly expanded cultivation of cotton was
another significant component of Central Asian economic development. Becker
and other historians of the region have noted that the sharp decline in American
cotton exports caused by the American Civil War 1861-1865 gave Russia an
excellent motivation to increase cotton production in Central Asia.36 After the
introduction of American cotton and cotton-milling techniques, cotton became
Central Asia’s chief cash crop, and this trend continued through the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.37 The Russian introduction of cotton into Central Asia
had calamitous social effects. It caused the economic and political
disenfranchisement of Turkestan’s peasantry and led directly to the rise of a
modern capitalist economy in the region. The cotton economy became the
primary foundation of the economic relationship between Central Asia and the
Tsarist and Soviet governments, and was a significant and durable source of
conflict. The historiography on the story of the cotton economy in Central Asia
is, therefore, significant, and will be examined in Chapter Four of this thesis.
Russia’s victory in the war with Bukhara (1865-1868) made this economic
transformation possible. It placed the Russians in the position of political
authority necessary to overhaul the physical and financial infrastructure of Central
Asia. It also meant that native leaders were necessarily relieved of a great deal of
their political authority, and most historians regard that war as the first major
assault on Central Asian sovereignty. Although the treaty concluded at the end of
the conflict was ostensibly only a commercial agreement between two sovereign
35
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states, many historians agree that the treaty was brought about by the force of
arms and the military subjugation of Bukhara. Pierce writes that “though
nominally independent the emir was thereafter an obedient vassal of Russia.”38
Becker explains that “Bukhara, like Kokand, had lost much of its independence of
action. Both states were in fact at Russia’s mercy.”39 Russia succeeded at
imposing this dependency in part by disallowing the abdication of Muzaffar adDin, the Emir of Bukhara from 1860 until 1885. Bukhara’s defeat under his
leadership had naturally hurt his credibility among the various other nobles in
Bukhara. Muzaffar al-Din asked for permission to abdicate and to go on a hajj to
Mecca, but the Russians compelled him to stay on the throne in Bukhara, because,
in Pierce’s words, “it was deemed important for Russia to have in Bukhara a ruler
who had learned to recognize Russian supremacy.”40 Becker echoes this
interpretation, writing that “Muzaffar was probably the most reliable ruler
possible for Bukhara, because he was chastened by his defeats of the past three
years and was dependent entirely upon Russia for the retention of his shaky
throne.”41 This policy, however, was not durable and the Tsarist government
spent the next half-century revising its policy in efforts to maintain dominance in
Central Asia. Ironically, as Becker notes, the final Russo-Khivan agreement was
signed less than a month before the Romanov dynasty itself ceased to exist.42

38

Ibid., 27.
Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 42.
40
Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 27.
41
Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 41.
42
Ibid., 236.
39

30

II. From the Bolshevik Revolution until the Death of Joseph Stalin
The period from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 until the death of
Joseph Stalin in 1953 saw Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the other Russian
Muslim regions form into the political entities that would become independent,
sovereign nation-states when the Soviet Union collapsed. Stalin dominates the
story of the Muslim nationalities during this period, first as Vladimir Lenin’s
Commissar of Nationalities and later as General Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In his first post, Stalin was charged with
managing Soviet nationality policy. In the early and tenuous post-revolutionary
years this meant securing for the Bolsheviks the political and military loyalty of
Russia’s various ethnic and religious minorities. As General Secretary, Stalin
devoted much of his energies to developing “forms of nationhood” and cultivating
national intellectual elites among the Muslim ethnicities of the Soviet Union.
Whether these efforts were an attempt at building actual Central Asian nations, or
just a continuation of Tsarist colonial oppression in a new guise, is the central
question which scholarship on this period of Soviet Islam tries to answer. The
next few pages will examine how historians have variously approached this topic.
Richard Pipes’ The Formation of the Soviet Union (1954) is one of the
standard accounts of how the USSR took shape as a reconstituted empire, and this
account necessarily includes much about the Soviet Muslim peoples in Central
Asia and elsewhere. The majority of this discussion is contained in Chapter IV,
titled “Soviet Conquest of the Moslem Borderlands.”43 The term “conquest”
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refers to the Bolshevik military campaigns in these regions as well as to their
political and diplomatic efforts to assert Communist Party control. Pipes frames
the history of early Soviet policy toward the Muslim nationalities as the interplay
of two competing interests: a drive to establish unchallenged political dominance
versus an effort to win the sympathy and support of Muslims. He summarizes
this interpretation at the end of the chapter:
Toward the Muslims, the communists therefore pursued a dual
course: on the one hand, seizure of power, overthrow of all native
institutions which challenged or refused to recognize Soviet
authority, and centralization of political power; on the other, a bid
for the sympathies of all strata of Muslim society by economic or
cultural concessions and an alliance with Muslim nationalists.44
Pipes notes that the Soviets’ “bid for the sympathies” of Russian Muslims
involved co-opting pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, and other Muslim nationalist
tendencies which the Soviets would later forcefully suppress. He provides
evidence of this tactic with a famous proclamation of the fledgling Soviet
government promising to liberate Russian Muslims – Turkic Central Asians and
Tatars alike – from the religious oppression of the old regime.45 As part of the
campaign to secure the support of the Muslim masses, Pipes discusses at length
Stalin’s brief association with Mustafa Sultan Galiev – a Tatar intellectual who in
the early 1920s advocated the idea that for communism to succeed in Asia, it must
adapt to Islamic cultural norms and an agrarian economy.46
Muslim political participation during the First World War and Civil War
was not limited to the Jadids and the Sultangalievists. By the beginning of the
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First World War, Russian Muslims were represented by a collection of nationwide
Islamic organizations. Predictably, these groups were involved in shaping the
extent and nature of Muslim political participation in the years during and
immediately after the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War. Their work
and influence is a major theme of Alexandre Bennigsen’s Islam in the Soviet
Union. The February and October Revolutions and the initial organization of the
Soviet Union are covered in Part II of Bennigsen’s book, titled “Revolution, Civil
War, and Bolshevik Triumph 1917-1923.” 47 The central theme in these chapters
is the struggle for unity among the various Muslim political groups in the Russian
empire during this time. Bennigsen presents a Muslim political movement that
was fractured along ideological, geographical, and socioeconomic lines. These
fractures are perhaps best illustrated in his discussion of the Volga Tatars. At the
time, the Kazan’ Socialist Committee existed as a nationalist umbrella
organization representing a wide spectrum of Tatar political affiliations. The
Committee was ostensibly associated with the Bolshevik Party and portrayed
itself as such in its propaganda, but in actuality it conducted itself very much as a
Muslim nationalist organization, working to create a Muslim “national” socialism
and liberate Russian Muslims from European colonial hegemony.48 Despite their
many significant political differences, the Tatar elite were able to present a united
front in their efforts to secure the interests of the Tatar people. Bennigsen
explains that the Bolsheviks intended the Kazan’ Socialist Committee and others
like it to be a tool with which to indoctrinate the Russian Muslim intelligentsia
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with Communist ideals, but that in effect it did more to ferment the development
of a Muslim nationalist elite.49 In his conclusion to Chapter V, Bennigsen
observes that “it would seem that the Tatars, aware of the rapid decay of the
Russian state, were pressing ahead… to protect their national interests in the
storm which by this time was evidently brewing.”50
Azade-Ayşe Rorlich presents much the same portrayal of the Kazan’
Socialist Committee in her book The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National
Resilience (1986). The book is a survey of this Muslim ethnic group from the
origins of the Kazan’ khanate in the fifteenth century through the post-World War
Two period. Like Bennigsen, Rorlich describes the committee as a nationalist
organization that “illustrated best the dynamics of unity in diversity.”51 Rorlich
describes a Bolshevik party that tolerated the committee’s nationalist and
religious tendencies because it viewed the organization as an instrument through
which to communicate with the Tatar people. However, the Bolsheviks failed to
appreciate that, for the members themselves, “Marxism was only secondary to
allegiance to national goals.”52 The political relationship portrayed here by
Rorlich is illustrative of her larger interpretation of the political relationship
between the Tatars and the Soviets during this period. To Rorlich, the story of the
Tatar people from 1917 through the beginning of the Second World War was the
story of the competing, but not mutually exclusive, ideologies of
Marxism/Leninism and Tatar nationalism. She holds that Tatar political
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organizations during this period espoused and promoted the Communist agenda in
order to be able to exist and promote their most vital interests – the development
of a strong Tatar nation.53
Rorlich’s interpretation of the Tatars’ political relationship with
Communism and with the early Soviet government is consistent with how many
other historians have portrayed the broader Muslim political relationship with the
Bolsheviks during this period.

The political relationship between the early

Soviets and Islam is concisely defined in Galina Yemelianova’s short book Russia
and Islam: A Historical Survey (2002). At the beginning of a chapter titled
“Muslims under Soviet Rule,” Yemelianova explains that “the initial Bolshevik
policy towards Islam and Muslims was characterized by considerable flexibility,
tolerance, and tactfulness.”54 Yemelianova’s mention of Bolshevik “tolerance
and tactfulness” is similar to Pipes’ mention of an early Soviet “bid for the
sympathies” of Russian Muslims. Both historians, writing nearly a half-century
apart from each other, understand early Bolshevik policy toward Russian Muslims
to be a calculated attempt to consolidate power among a large and potentially
volatile ethnic and religious minority. Yemelianova extends her portrayal of
Russian political policy toward Islam to the more specific subject of the Russian
conquest of Central Asia: the Russian advance in that region was, she writes,
“inconsistent and determined by the political, ethnic, and ideological
circumstances at a particular locality in a particular moment of time.”55
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She credits this assessment of Russian policy in Central Asia to one of
Hélène Carrère d’Encausse’s essays in Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian
Dominance. The essay, “Civil War and New Governments,” discusses how
Soviet leaders confronted the challenges to Bolshevik power after the 1917
Revolutions. Carrère d’Encausse argues that the Bolshevik strategy in large part
consisted of compromising various communist principles such as class struggle
and abolition of private property in the interests of securing Muslim support for
the Bolshevik cause in Central Asia.56
There as in other Muslim regions, the Bolshevik strategy to secure
indigenous support also involved enlisting the vocal support of Muslim
communists. Yemelianova explains how Sultan-Galiev and other Tatar
communists made a concerted effort to downplay communist atheism and gender
and class egalitarianism and emphasize parallels – actual or imagined – between
Islam and communism. Chief among these parallels was the shared Muslim and
Marxist principle of communalism, of putting the interests of the group above
those of the individual. The viability of these efforts has been questioned by other
historians, but Yemelianova concludes that “on the whole, Muslim communism
provided a valuable framework for a productive relationship between the Russian
center and the Muslim periphery.”57 She believes that the effectiveness of the
strategy of the Muslim communists has been underrated, and that its effect was
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perhaps most significant in forestalling an alliance between anti-Bolshevik
Muslims and White Russians.58 The significance of the Sultan-Galievists and the
Jadids, and the various other Muslim reform movements, have proven to be a
significant area of historical inquiry in and of themselves, and the scholarship on
these movements will be examined in a later chapter.
The degree to which the Bolsheviks tolerated Islam or cooperated with its
leaders is widely disputed. In To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign
Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941 (2001), Shoshana Keller traces what
she understands as an aggressive and vicious campaign against Islamic
institutions, customs, and religiosity in Central Asia. Her first chapter provides
the historical background of Islam in pre-Revolutionary Central Asia, and in it she
portrays Russian authorities who were at once fearful, dismissive, and ignorant of
Islam as a social force. What other historians have portrayed as neglect or noninterference, Keller presents as an utter lack of strategy or policy. “Imperial
Russia never did resolve the place of Muslims in the empire,” she writes: “the
actions of Russian officials were dictated by current needs and prejudices rather
than any coherent policy, resulting in a muddle.”59
What was a “muddle” during the Tsarist era became a concerted antireligious campaign under the Bolsheviks. Keller believes that Soviet power in
Central Asia was simply an ideologically-motivated reincarnation of the Imperial
Russian Empire. A Russian-dominated government still imposed its will on the
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oppressed Muslim peoples of Central Asia.60 To Moscow, Not Mecca discusses
various aspects of the anti-religious effort, to include attacks on Islamic
institutions, clergy, and belief in general. Keller portrays these attacks as
Moscow-directed initiatives, with participation but little real leadership from
Central Asian communists. She finds that most anti-religious agitation on the part
of Central Asians was a symbolic gesture intended to appease communist
authorities.61 The notable exception to this rule was the anti-religious efforts of
Mustafa Sultan-Galiev, a prominent Tatar communist who supported the ultimate
goal of the campaign but who disagreed with some of the specific tactics.62 Their
motivations for this effort were clear and unequivocal: atheism was a central
component of communist ideology, and the new state’s fear of any competing
institution or ideology.63 Keller concludes that the Soviet anti-religious campaign
in Central Asia was a success in that it severely damaged Islamic institutions and
religiosity in the region, but that it failed to disarm Islam as a cultural identifier
and social force.64
III. From Khrushchev through Perestroika and Collapse
The period from the death of Stalin until the accession of Gorbachev and
his perestroika reforms was until recently a neglected and understudied era of
Soviet history. While there is a glut of historical and sociological studies on
Soviet Islam from the 1980’s, the same subject during the 1960’s and 1970’s was
comparatively less well studied. Yaacov Roi makes reference to this
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historiographical gap in the preface to his book, Islam in the Soviet Union: From
the Second World War to Gorbachev (2000). This 764-page tome is the most
exhaustive study of the Soviet relationship with Islam during the post-war period,
and it examines multiple aspects of the Russian relationship with Islam after
World War II. Roi devotes much of the book to defining the role and relative
influence of the Council on the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC) and the other
bureaucracies which influenced and enforced Soviet policy towards the Muslims.
He also attempts to ascertain the specific level of Islamic religiosity practiced by
the various Soviet Muslim ethnicities. In the introduction, Roi divides the history
of post-war Soviet policy into four distinct phases that parallel the general trend
of Soviet relations with other relations. The first, during and immediately after
the Second World War, was characterized by a willingness to tolerate religion in
an attempt to secure maximum support for the war effort. The period 1947-1954
saw a return to more repressive policies toward Islam and other religions. The
first three years of the post-Stalin “thaw” saw a brief return to a policy of
liberalization and religious freedom, but the years 1958-1964 experienced a
reversal of this policy. Finally, the Brezhnev era (1964-1982) was characterized
by a tacit toleration of Islam in the interest of stability and normalcy.65
Part Five of Roi’s book is specifically focused on Moscow’s policy toward
Islam and the Soviet Muslim peoples. Roi finds that it was not characterized by
any consistent, identifiable trends. He argues that Soviet policy makers did not
make an Islam-specific policy, but rather believed that a broad Soviet religious
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policy would be sufficient for managing Islam. He suggests that the Soviets’
ambiguous stance on Islam was in large part descended from a similar
“lackadaisical” attitude among the Tsarist administrators of Central Asia.66 In this
interpretation, there is an indirect political lineage between von Kaufmann’s
strategy of non-interference and the prevailing Soviet approach towards Islam.
The perception of intellectual lineage between the Tsarist and Soviet
policies regarding Islam is also addressed in Geoffrey Wheeler’s essay “Islam and
the Soviet Union.” The essay, derived from a lecture given at the Central Asian
Research Centre in London, was published in Asian Affairs in May 1979.
Wheeler writes that “the Soviets’ attitude towards Islamic culture resembled that
of the Tsarist regime in the sense that they at first believed that it would quickly
give way before the Russian culture and way of life.”67 However, Wheeler argues
that the two regimes fundamentally differed in that the Soviets took a far more
active and aggressive role in promoting social and economic modernization and
the adoption of a uniquely “Soviet” form of existence. Wheeler’s thesis is that an
overly aggressive Soviet campaign of modernization and social reform caused
resentment among the Muslim peoples and galvanized their resistance to the
Soviet regime.68 He offers three indicators to support this hypothesis, the most
prominent of which is that the newly developed Soviet Muslim intelligentsia
embarked on a “do-it-yourself modernization of Islam” – namely that the Soviet
system educated and modernized Muslims to the extent that central Communist
tutelage was no longer necessary. He also argues that the modern Muslim
66

Ibid., 562-563.
Geoffrey Wheeler, “Islam in the Soviet Union,” Asian Affairs 10 (October 1979), 247.
68
Ibid., 248.
67

40

resentment toward Soviet rule was not new, but that Central Asians and the other
Russian Muslim ethnic groups “have always resented the Russian presence in
their midst.”69 Wheeler concludes that “Soviet hopes of achieving the cultural
and biological function of its Moslems with those of the rest of the Union are not
being realized, and are perhaps unrealizable, by the methods being used.”70
Wheeler’s argument assumes that there was always an inherent, deepseated Muslim resentment of Russian rule. He writes that “resistance to sweeping
Soviet reforms has inevitably been passive and for many years there have been no
overt signs of dissidence.”71 However, this argument does not allow for the Tatar
Sultangalievist movement, the Kyrgyz Basmachi revolts, or the resistance to the
Soviet unveiling campaign in Uzbekistan. While Wheeler’s neglect of the
unveiling campaign could perhaps be explained by the lack of archival access, the
other two challenges to Soviet rule were well documented in Western
historiography when he wrote the essay.72 His argument also assumes that Soviet
policy toward Muslims was made with the ultimate goal of cultural and even
biological integration with the whole of the Soviet people.
That ultimate goal of Soviet policy towards Muslim Central Asians and
other ethnicities of the Soviet Union has been the subject of extensive and
sometimes contentious academic debate. One of the classic works on the subject
is Yuri Slezkine’s article in Slavic Review, titled “The USSR as a Communal
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Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism.” The essay
is, in his words, “an attempt to recognize the earnestness of Bolshevik efforts on
behalf of ethnic particularism.”73 Slezkine argues that these efforts were indeed
undertaken in earnest, and that they were largely aimed at overcoming the ethnic
distrust and resentment prevalent among the oppressed ethnicities of the former
Russian empire.74 Furthermore, he disagrees with the popular consensus that
Soviet nationality policy was a cynical attempt to keep Soviet ethnicities in
perpetual conflict:
Bolshevik officials in Moscow saw the legitimation of ethnicity as
a concession to ethnic grievances and developmental constraints,
not as a brilliant divide-and-rule stratagem, and confidently
asserted, after Lenin and Stalin, that the more genuine the ‘national
demarcation’ the more successful the drive to internationalism.75
While Slezkine’s article is not specific to the Muslim ethnicities of Central Asia
and Tatarstan, the issues he addresses are clearly relevant to these peoples. The
“divide-and-rule stratagem” that he references is a common explanation for the
Soviet Union’s complex system of “national” political units, to include the five
Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) in Central Asia.
Other scholars, too, have brought to light information showing that the
Soviet government strove to make these new republics viable, self-supporting
political units, and to do so it actively promoted the creation of national
intellectual elites among the “backward” nationalities. The Soviet government’s
method of achieving this goal was called korenizatsiia (“indigenization” or
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“nativization”) and is the primary focus of Terry Martin’s book The Affirmative
Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (2001).
The book’s title refers to an important aspect of korenizatsiia in that the policy
involved specific hiring and educational quotas for members of nationalities
within their respective national republics. Aside from building national
intellectual and professional elites, Martin explains, the overall goal of
korenizatsiia and Soviet nationalities policy was to preempt the threat of ethnic
nationalism. In his introduction, Martin sums up the logic behind Soviet
nationalities policy: “nationalism will be disarmed by granting the forms of
nationhood.”76 Martin also squarely concurs with Slezkine’s characterization of
nationalities policy as a genuine attempt at promoting the development of ethnic
particularism, writing that “the Soviet Union did systematically promote the
distinctive national identity and national self-consciousness of its non-Russian
populations.”77 He argues that, while in the mid-1930’s Soviet authorities came
to elevate the status of the former “oppressor” Russians, along with their culture
and their language, there was still never any attempt to Russify the Soviet Union.
The Affirmative Action Empire ends with the conclusion that “the Soviet Union
was not a nation-state. No attempt was ever made to create a Soviet nationality or
to turn the Soviet Union into a Russian nation-state.”78
Martin’s book and many others examined in this thesis were written with
the primary purpose of establishing the historical legacy of some aspect of the
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Russian relationship with Central Asian Islam. However, some of the scholarship
on the topic aimed to provide historical context for understanding the current
situation of Central Asian Muslims. Shortly after Leonid Brezhnev’s death in
1982, two books were published which attempted to place the Soviet Union’s
contemporary relationship with Central Asian Islam in historical context.
Michael Rywkin’s Moscow’s Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (1982)
examines briefly the political, economic, and social place of Central Asian
Muslims in the Tsarist and Soviet empires during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Rywkin argues that the rise of Islamic nationalism and the geopolitical
importance of Central Asia would cause the region to become the Soviet Union’s
“number one internal occupation by the last decade of our century.”79 Alexandre
Bennigsen’s and Marie Broxup’s short survey, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet
State (1983), concisely examines the development of this threat and analyzes the
various strategies which the Tsarist and Soviet states employed to confront it.
Much of the last chapter, titled “Soviet Islam in Perspective,” is devoted to
predicting the future of the coexistence between Islam and the Soviet state. The
authors conclude that, on balance, communism was a workable ideology for
Russia’s Muslims, but that these groups could not be indefinitely denied their
national self-determination. The last paragraph in the book is particularly apt:
“barring a major crisis…the present status quo in the Soviet Union will be
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uncompromisingly preserved…. The final, inescapable, violent crisis will be
delayed, but for how long?”80
Conclusion
Few historians have chosen to write on the specific subject of Tsarist and
Soviet political policy towards the Muslims. The topic is difficult to isolate and
leads seamlessly into discussions of Islamic nationalism, revolts, and various
other facets of the relationship between Islam and Russian rule. Nevertheless, it
is possible to identify and isolate some general trends in how Western historians
have portrayed the Russian political relationship with Islam in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. First, there was until recently a general agreement that during
the nineteenth century Tsarist administrators approached Islam with a policy of
official apathy. Neither suppressing nor supporting the religion and its associated
customs, the Tsarist administrators were chiefly concerned with maintaining
stability in Central Asia and elsewhere in order to maximize strategic and
economic returns. Recently, however, Robert Crews has strongly challenged this
thesis, and either the affirmation or rejection of his challenge is likely to become a
significant trend in the historiography of the topic. Second, there is no consensus
regarding the issue of whether and to what extent the early Soviet Union remained
a colonial state. This question is important to those attempting to judge the legacy
of the Soviet Union since much of the propaganda, and indeed the core ideology
of the state, emphasized the necessity of national self-determination. Arguing that
the Soviet Union remained colonialist, as does Richard Pipes, for example,
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undermines one of the key justifications for the state’s legitimacy. Martin
emphasizes this dynamic in The Affirmative Action Empire, writing that the Soviet
Union defined itself as “an anti-imperial state.” Soviet leaders “were not
indifferent to the word ‘empire.’ They rejected it explicitly.”81 Lastly, the
scholarship on the political nature of Russian Islam since the death of Stalin tends
to focus on how much the religion challenged the authority of the Soviet state and
ultimately contributed to its collapse. Histories of the subject published before
1991 tend to focus on nationalism and the potential destabilizing effect of Islam,
while works published after the collapse attempt to determine to what extent
Islam contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet state. The most significant of
these phenomena was Islamic nationalism. Through the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, Islamic nationalism grew from a weak and transient social phenomenon
to one of the most significant threats to Moscow’s power. The next chapter will
examine how Western historians have portrayed this powerful and fluid force.
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CHAPTER TWO
A HISTORY OF PEOPLE, FAITH, AND PROGRESS:
WESTERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF ISLAMIC NATIONALISM IN RUSSIA
In the aftermath of the breakup of the USSR, nationalism has become a
point of fascination for scholars of modern Russia. In a parallel trend, the nations
and peoples of the Tsarist and Soviet empires have also provided numerous case
studies and models for scholars of nationalism. Most studies of Islam in the
Tsarist and Soviet periods include significant sections about nationalism. Indeed,
in many instances the development of nationalism is the overarching theme. The
story of this movement in Central Asia and Tatarstan is necessarily closely tied to
other historical developments such as official policies and the intellectual and
social development in these regions. The central debate surrounding nationalism
during the Tsarist era centers on the extent of national consciousness that existed
among Russia’s Muslims, if at all. Historians of the early Soviet era have focused
much of their effort on trying to understand the actual purpose and ultimate effect
of Stalin’s nationalities policy. Histories examining the post-Stalinist period until
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 have attempted to gauge the destabilizing
effect of Islamic nationalism in a stagnating imperial polity. One of the chief
ironies in the story of Islamic nationalism in all of these eras is that Russian
authorities believed that the social and economic modernization of the Muslims in
their midst would dissuade them from insisting on greater national autonomy. In

reality, these efforts had much the opposite effect, and this irony has been noticed
and examined by many historians.
In telling the story of Islamic nationalism in the Tsarist and Soviet
empires, Western scholars have written a history of people, faith, and progress.
These three factors are the overarching themes in the Western historical
understanding of Islamic nationalism in Russia during the Tsarist and Soviet
periods. In their emphasis on social bonds and shared cultural practices,
historians have cast the idea of a single, unified people as the foundation for
notions of nationalism. The Islamic faith has been portrayed as the most
important identifier which made Central Asians and Tatars different from their
Russian rulers. Finally, historians have found that social progress – namely
literacy and technological modernization – has been the catalyst which has ignited
and enabled nationalist drives for self-determination. This chapter will examine
how Western historians have portrayed the balance and interaction between these
factors in their studies of the development of Islamic nationalism in Russia.
I. Finding the Genesis of Muslim Nationalism in the Russian Empire
“It cannot be too strongly emphasized,” wrote Geoffrey Wheeler in 1964,
“that in Central Asia there was nothing whatever in the way of national sentiment
or state loyalty” before the Russian conquest.1 Here, Wheeler takes an absolute,
unqualified position on the status of nationalism and national identity in Tsarist
Central Asia. He argues that loyalties in the region during the mid-nineteenth
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century were almost entirely to family, tribe, and other sub-national units.2 While
not a professional historian, Wheeler’s interpretation of this topic is representative
of that of many scholars of Muslim nationalism in the Russian empire. If there
was indeed “nothing in the way of national sentiment or state loyalty” among
Russia’s Muslims at the time of conquest, one of the most significant questions on
the subject is: When did it begin to develop? There are two general scholarly
consensuses regarding the genesis of Islamic nationalism in the Russian Empire:
that the 1905 Revolution provided energy and stimulus to burgeoning national
movements, and that the Tatars were at the forefront. The primacy of the Tatars
and the significance of the 1905 Revolution is emphasized both in general surveys
of Russian imperialism as well as in more specific studies. In The Russian
Empire: A Multiethnic History (2001), Andreas Kappeler discusses the
development of Tatar national identity in his chapter on “The National
Challenge.” The Tatar national movement, he explains, was fueled by an
educational and literary rebirth among that ethnic group, and was closely
associated with the Jadid reform movement. A small cadre of Tatar intellectuals,
led by Ismail Bey Gaspirali, provided the impetus for the movement.3 Through a
dual program of social reform and religious revival, these elites began to build the
foundations of a Tatar nation. Kappeler’s emphasis on the social reforms of the
Jadids illustrates his belief that social progress – in this case the development of a
Tatar literary tradition – was a necessary precondition for the rise of a full-fledged
national movement.
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Recent works on the development of Muslim nationalism in Central Asia
have taken issue with the idea that there was “nothing whatsoever in the way of
national sentiment” in pre-colonial Central Asia. These works have argued that
there were indeed elements of national identity among the peoples of Central Asia
prior to the Russian conquest. This challenge has been argued most convincingly
by Adrienne Edgar in Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (2004).
Although most of the book is about the early history of Turkmenistan as a Soviet
Socialist Republic (SSR), in her introduction and first chapter she argues that
many of the foundations necessary for a modern nation were actually present
among the Turkmen people long before Soviet nation-building commenced.
Edgar writes that “although Turkmen identity had few concrete political or
economic manifestations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the idea
that the tribes shared a glorious ancestry and history – and the hope that they
might one day unite – has long been a staple of Turkmen discourse.”4 Here,
Edgar is emphasizing the importance of common ethnic bonds – the idea of a
single, unified “people” – in building the foundations of a modern nation.
Perhaps no Muslim ethnicity has had more collective experience with
Russian policy than the Tatars. As the first Muslims to become subjects of the
Tsar in the sixteenth century, the Tatar people have had a long and intimate
relationship with Russian rule. In studies of the Russian relationship with Islam,
historians have consistently portrayed the Tatars as the ethnic group at the
forefront of Muslim social, cultural, and political developments in Russia and the
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Soviet Union. The primacy of the Tatars and the significance of the Revolution
are perhaps most clearly articulated in Richard Pierce’s book, Russian Asia: A
Study in Colonial Rule (1960). In his chapter on “The Rise of National
Consciousness,” Pierce explains that, while Central Asians were not directly
involved in the events of the 1905 Revolution, they did draw a degree of
inspiration from the it. Despite the best efforts of the Tsarist administrators,
“some elements of native society slowly assimilated new ideas and influences
brought by the conqueror.”5
Some societies assimilated these ideas more quickly than others, and
among the Muslims of the Russian Empire, “the Volga Tatars took the lead.”6 In
his discussion of the growth of national sentiment among Muslim Central Asians,
Pierce also hints at a pan-Islamic component to this phenomenon:
Central Asians receptive to new influences found kindred spirits among
other Moslem peoples of the empire. During the second half century of
the nineteenth century a stirring began among all these peoples, a distant
reverberation of the contemporary nationalism of Europe, a restlessness at
living under infidel rule, a growing awareness that while the rest of the
world moved on, they had been standing still.7
His reference to “a restlessness at living under infidel rule” suggests that, to some
degree, Muslims in the Russian Empire had begun to absorb and accept the
concept of a right to national self-determination. It also suggests that there was a
distinctly religious component to this stirring, that the Muslims of the Russian
Empire felt they were entitled to be ruled by native leaders, or at least by Islamic
coreligionists. Hélène Carrère d’Encausse as well stresses the significance of the
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Tatars and the 1905 Revolution. In her discussion of reform movements in
Bukhara, Carrère d’Encausse explains that the movements were led and inspired
by the Tatars, who, “as throughout Turkestan, furnished the new ideas.”8 In her
chapter on “National Awakening in Turkestan,” d’Encausse writes that from 1905
onward,
Russia’s Muslims envisaged a possible end to colonial domination. All
the rancours and problems which racked the empire’s Muslim periphery
were linked to the dream that was suddenly taking shape: the dream of
independence. The 1905 revolution further accelerated this awakening of
national consciousness among Russia’s Muslims.9
The language that the aforementioned scholars use when describing the
genesis of Islamic nationalism in the Russian empire is noteworthy. There is a
distinctly triumphant undertone to much of their generalizations and conclusions
regarding the topic. This voice is present in Pierce (“a distant reverberation… a
restlessness at living under infidel rule”) and Carrère d’Encausse (“the dream that
was suddenly taking shape: the dream of independence”). Their tone is
instructive in that both Pierce and Carrère d’Encausse first published their books
in the 1960s, a decade when the peoples of various colonies in Africa and
elsewhere were agitating for their own independence. It is possible that in the
Muslims of the Russian empire, scholars saw an inspirational historical model for
contemporary struggles for national self-determination. It is equally likely that
the references to dreams of independence or resentment of infidel rule were
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intended to be antagonistic towards the contemporaneous “foreign” rulers of
Central Asia’s Muslims: the Soviets.
The Kazakhs provide an interesting case study in the history of Muslim
nationalism in the Russian empire in that, unlike the sedentary societies of Kazan’
and Bukhara, Islam enjoyed only a marginal presence in Kazakh society before
the late nineteenth century. In The Kazakhs (1987), Martha Brill Olcott argues
that the rise of Islam was affected and paralleled by the creation of a Kazakh
national elite. Among their other goals, these young Kazakh intellectuals “were
committed to the merging of Kazakh culture and Islam.”10 The idea that the
Islamic religion and Central Asian nationality have a dependent, even symbiotic
relationship is an important concept in the history of Islam in Russia and is
echoed in the historiography on later periods in Russian and Soviet history.
Azade-Ayşe Rorlich devotes an entire chapter to “The Religious-Secular
Symbiosis” in The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience (1986), a
history in the same Hoover Institution series as The Kazakhs.11 Rorlich credits
Tatar educational reforms as well as the burgeoning indigenous publishing
industry with contributing to the growth of a religious-secular symbiosis and,
ultimately, the development of a Tatar nation.12
In The Kazakhs, Olcott is careful to distinguish between this new Kazakh
elite and the previous generation of Muslim reformers. The most significant
difference between the two groups of intellectuals, she argues, is that the new
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generation of Kazakh intellectuals had a real and significant impact on the lives of
ordinary Kazakhs, whereas the earlier reformers’ significance was comparatively
limited in terms of popular impact.13 In general, Olcott presents the spread of
Islam among the Kazakhs as a phenomenon that simultaneously contributed to the
development of a Kazakh nation and fuelled resentment and resistance to Russian
rule. She characterizes the turn-of-the-century Kazakh nation as such:
During these decades straddling the turn of the century, the Kazakhs
increasingly thought and acted as a homogenous community. This was
partly because of the Russian policy of secular education, which led to the
development of a self-aware Kazakh elite, and partly a product of the
spread of Islam.14
Olcott, like many other historians of Islam in the Russian empire, identifies the
Russian-sponsored secular education system as a direct stimulus to the
development of Muslim national consciousness. This characterization is
significant because it implicates the Russians themselves in contributing to
Kazakh resentment to foreign rule. The fact that the Kazakhs were becoming
more resentful of Russian rule did not eliminate internal political and social
disagreements but, as Olcott explains, “most Kazakhs felt that such rifts should be
bridged when presented to the outside world.”15
The place of the native intelligentsia in the origins of early Kazakh
nationalism is an important subject in Olcott’s book and is the central subject in
Steven Sabol’s Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazak [sic] National
Consciousness (2003). In his book, Sabol examines the historical role of three
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key members of Alash Orda, an early Kazakh political party and nationalist
organization. Sabol uses his treatment of these three Kazakh leaders to support
his thesis that a genuine and viable national intelligentsia did not develop until
after the turn of the twentieth century.16 Their agenda was two-fold: on the one
hand, modernization and education; on the other, preservation of Kazakh
traditions and values. The intelligentsia’s central challenge was subordinating
regional, clan, and other sub-national identifiers to a broad new Kazakh national
identity. This would be accomplished, Sabol explains, by celebrating those
cultural practices that were common to the whole of the Kazakh people. He
explains their goal in his conclusion:
The nineteenth and twentieth century intelligentsia conceptualized
Kazak national identity around unifying cultural and social
symbols of the Kazaks’ nomadic pastoral past. To accomplish this
the Kazak intelligentsia had to overcome centuries of traditional
social structure whose principal sources of strength and history
relied upon smaller sources than any specific national persona.17
They faced a difficult paradox, one similar to those faced by ambitious
nationalists in other nations: modernize too much, and the people lose national
distinctiveness; retain too many distinctive traditions and customs, and they are
unable to become a modern, progressive nation.
The paradox of progress and nationalism is not unique to Sabol’s
interpretation and is generally accepted by most scholars of modern nationalism.
The distinctive feature of Sabol’s book is that it emphasizes the historical
significance of a Kazakh political party in creating Kazakh national
16
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consciousness. Kazakh nationalism was not an inevitable historical trend, but
rather the result of a concerted initiative conceived by a specific group of
intellectuals and activists who understood that, in order for Kazakhstan to enjoy
independence from modern nation-states it had to itself become a modern nationstate.
Many historians believe that the Soviets encountered resistance in their
mission of social change in Central Asia because Central Asians perceived them
as foreign subjugators, the embodiment of infidel rule. While this argument is
accurate in many respects, the Soviets were not the first group to meet resistance
in their goal to modernize the region. Beginning in the 1880s, the Jadids, a
Muslim reformist group originating among the Tatars, initiated an agenda to
modernize what they perceived as a stagnant and backward Central Asian
establishment. Originating with a fairly limited program of modernizing and
reforming Muslim schools, the movement soon expanded into a more ambitious
mission of wholesale reform of Muslim society in Central Asia. Essentially, the
Jadids wanted to modernize Muslim society while leaving intact, or even
strengthening, its Muslim foundations.
One of the first major western studies of the Jadid movement is contained
in Carrère d’Encausse’s Islam and the Russian Empire. In a section on “The
Jadids and the Struggle for Reforms,” she explains why initial Russian attempts to
modernize Central Asian society failed, writing that “one feeling was rooted in
the people – perhaps the only conscious feeling it had – hostility to Russia. The
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reforms had failed precisely because they came from the Russians.”18 The Jadids
had the advantage of being Muslim and not being Russian. For forty years prior
to the Revolution, the Jadids had labored to reform Muslim society in Turkestan
with limited success, mainly because of their position outside of the official
institutions of Central Asian society. During the Russian Civil War, the Jadids
were incorporated into a provisional government with the help of the Bolsheviks,
who were willing to share power with Muslim leaders in order to bring stability to
the region. However, as Carrère d’Encausse explains, the revolution that finally
gave the Jadids official power also created economic conditions that made their
social reforms unlikely:
Even if the Jadids succeeded in expressing the problems of the
masses, the masses were incapable of following them; tradition
kept then tied to their religious leaders. The conquest, by
aggravating their economic difficulties, did not help to hasten their
political maturity; on the contrary, it drove those wretched masses,
obsessed with the sole problem of survival, back towards the
traditional order, towards stability... At the same time that they
wanted an absolute change in their material situation, the masses
remained attached to the conservative Islam of their ancestors.
Therefore, to gain an audience among them, it was necessary to
move in the direction of religious orthodoxy, which ultimately put
a brake on social transformations. It was this isolated position
within Bukharan society that constituted the tragedy of reformism
and the basic reason for its collapse.19
In the crisis of the Civil War, the “wretched masses” of the Bukharan peasantry
sought the stability and familiarity of Islam and traditional institutions. In this
interpretation, Islam stands out as a very real obstacle to social change and, more
importantly progress. The Jadids, for their part, could only make headway among
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this population by abandoning the agenda and principles which unified them as a
social movement.
The most significant work on the Jadid movement has been done by
Adeeb Khalid, a scholar of Central Asian cultural and intellectual history. His
book, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (2000) is
the first comprehensive English-language survey of the topic. Khalid believes
that despite being a historically significant social reform effort, the Jadid
movement has gone largely unstudied by scholars of both Russian and Muslim
history. His book is in part an effort to place the Jadid movement in the context
of Muslim cultural reform movements in other regions of the world, to including
North Africa and the Middle East.20 Khalid explains that the Jadid movement was
inherently contentious in that it explicitly aimed to supplant and replace what it
perceived as antiquated and inhibitory institutions. In the introduction to his
book, he writes that “the Jadids, in diagnosing the ills of their society and
prescribing the cure… were usurping the moral and cultural authority of the
established religious-cultural elites…. Not surprisingly, the Jadid project
provoked considerable opposition.”21
In its discussion of how the Jadids shaped the development of Muslim
nationalism in Central Asia, Khalid’s book is also about Central Asian
distinctiveness. In Chapter Six, titled “Imagining the Nation,” Khalid notes that
the major existing historical portrayals of Central Asian identity all cast that
identity as a component of or reaction to some greater identity or movement, such
20
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as Pan-Turkism or hostility to Russian rule.22 The purpose of his chapter is to
“rescue history from the hegemony of the nation by showing how the nation itself
is the product of history.”23 Here, Khalid is taking part in one of the most
fundamental questions in the modern understanding of nationalism: Are nations
innate, timeless entities, or are they the cumulative product of specific events,
ideas, and leaders? Khalid makes a convincing case for the latter, arguing that the
Jadids had a very specific vision of their Muslim nation. The Jadid movement
was closely wedded to the development of modern Muslim nationalism in that its
supporters believed that Islamic Central Asian civilization could only be
preserved through social progress, not in spite of it. Khalid’s book and the recent
scholarly interest in the Jadids are perhaps the latest incarnation of the idea that
social progress and religious faith were necessary ingredients in the development
of Muslim nationalism in Central Asia.
Carrère d’Encausse and Khalid both portray the Jadids as conducting a
complex political balancing act: securing Muslim support while not straying too
far from their modernizing agenda, and promoting that modernizing agenda while
not abandoning what they felt should be the Islamic foundations of their Central
Asian society. Both historians also portray the Jadids as being in constant,
inherent conflict with the Tsarist authorities who regarded them as a dangerous
nationalist movement. However, this portrayal has recently been questioned by
Robert Crews in his book For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and
Central Asia (2006). The main argument in Crews’ book is that conflict between
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Tsarist Russia and Islam has been overemphasized in the existing historiography
of the subject, and that the Tsarist government and indigenous Muslim institutions
in fact cooperated and used each others’ resources to advance their own interests.
Although the Jadids are not the main subject of For Prophet and Tsar, Crews’
examination of their historical role is very much in line with his broad thesis. The
Jadids, he suggests, often worked closely with Tsarist institutions in order to
advance their modernizing agenda. He also notes that both the Jadids and more
conservative groups used the Tsarist judicial and administrative system to fight
their common battle against what they perceived as the moral decay of Muslim
society in Central Asia.24
II. Islamic Nationalism in the Empire of Nations
While the Tsarist government and indigenous political parties did make
advancements in their respective efforts to modernize Central Asia, none of these
initiatives were conducted on anywhere near the scale as were the projects of the
next government. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 brought to power a regime
obsessed, for better or worse, with the proper place of nations and nationalism in
its new order. Leninist ideology entailed a firm belief in the rights of nations and
oppressed peoples as a necessity for the creation of a classless society. The
legitimacy of the Soviet regime rested in large part on its ability to promote these
rights. However, this early obsession was in large part an outgrowth of a fear that
repressed nations and unrealized national ambitions could also preclude the
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achievement of Soviet goals. In fact, Lenin and the early Bolsheviks perceived
nations as an obstacle to the creation of a true communist state.
The scholarship on Islamic nationalism in the early Soviet era has centered
around two broad questions. The first has sought to determine the intent and
motivation of early Soviet nationalities policy. Was Soviet nationality policy a
genuine attempt at helping nationalities work through their phases of national
development on the road to a true communist society? Or was it, more cynically,
an attempt at repackaging the Russian ethnic dominance of the Tsarist era? The
second question has been this: Regardless of motivation or intent, how did Soviet
nationalities policy actually influence the development of national identity among
the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union? In answering these two questions,
historians have identified the policy of korenizatsiia (“indigenization”) and the
campaign against the veil as issues which, intentionally or otherwise, affected the
emergence of nations and nationalism among the Muslim peoples of the early
Soviet Union. There were many contradictions inherent in the policy of actively
promoting national identity within an empire. The most striking of these
contradictions was the problematic conflict between promoting a form of national
identity closely wedded to the Islamic faith even as the Communist Party insisted
on promoting atheism. Historians have disagreed on the extent to which Soviet
authorities actively fought Islam and persecuted believers, and this chapter will
address these debates. Much attention has also been paid to the concepts of PanTurkism and Pan-Islamism as ideologies that the Soviets at once feared and tried
to co-opt. Finally, as with most other subjects relating to the early Soviet Union,
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Joseph Stalin is a significant and omnipresent figure in the discussion of
nationalism in this era.
Stalin indeed looms large on the cover of Terry Martin’s book The
Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 19231939 (2001). In the photograph, Stalin is enthusiastically meeting with Turkmen
and Tajik collective farmers, all adorned in traditional ethnic dress. The picture is
a graphic allusion to Stalin’s policy of cultivating and nurturing the development
of separate national identities within the Soviet Union. Although the book is not
exclusively about the Muslim nationalities, the issues it addresses are directly
related to understanding the nature of Muslim nationalism in the early Soviet
Union. Martin argues that Lenin and Stalin perceived nationalism and national
identity as an obstacle to the attainment of a pure socialist state. However, they
believed that by promoting the development of nations, class divisions would
become more obvious. Oppressed classes in these nations would then support the
socialist agenda.25 By actively guiding the development of nations, the new
communist state could preempt the perils of nationalism, or as Martin explains,
“nationalism would be disarmed by granting the forms of nationhood.”26
The risks of nationalism were more hazardous in some parts of the Soviet
Union than in others, and Martin devotes much of his book to understanding how
nationalism and the Soviet reaction to it varied between various territories. In a
discussion of “National Soviets and Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet East,” Martin
examines the differences in ethnic conflict among the Tatars, the Kazakhs, and the
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Uzbeks. Ethnic conflict varied in these regions due to differences in the economic
situation, the duration of the Imperial Russian presence there, the contentiousness
of agricultural collectivization, and so forth.27 The purpose of Martin’s
comparison is to provide case studies for understanding the various situations and
conditions under which nationalism and ethnic conflict could develop. The
comparison illustrates that, even in a state as authoritarian as the Soviet Union,
there could nevertheless be a great deal of variation in how ethnic nationalism
develops.
Much of Martin’s examination of nations and nationalism in the early
Soviet Union involves Stalin’s policy of korenizatsiia. The policy involved the
active creation of distinct Soviet nations through various ethnicity-specific
linguistic, cultural, and territorial policies that were an integral part of the
campaign to “grant the forms of nationhood” to culturally “backward” ethnicities.
The Soviets soon discovered that it would be nearly impossible and not at all
desirable to grant the forms of nationhood to all Soviet nationalities. Martin
himself points this out in his chapter on “The Great Retreat.” He describes
korenizatsiia as “a prophylactic policy designed to defuse and prevent the
development of nationalism among the formerly oppressed non-Russian colonial
peoples through the provision of national territories, languages, elites, and
cultures.”28
This process was most difficult in Muslim Central Asia and in other lessdeveloped regions of the USSR, because in those areas national identities were
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less concrete, and any attempt to form an “Uzbek” or a “Kyrgyz” nation
necessarily involved “the consolidation of disparate local identities into a larger
national identity.”29 The “consolidation” to which Martin is referring was the
Soviet process of bringing together various small clans and tribes in order to form
an actual “nationality” capable of warranting and sustaining its own Soviet
Socialist Republic. Martin’s idea that the Central Asian nationalities were largely
Soviet creations is partly in conflict with the thesis presented by Adrienne Edgar.
She believes, regarding the Turkmen people at least, that many of the essential
ingredients of nationhood were present in the pre-Soviet and even pre-colonial
periods.30
Martin denies that Soviet nationalities policy was an attempt to create a
Soviet nation-state, writing that “the Soviet Union was not a nation-state. No
attempt was ever made to create either a Soviet nationality or to turn the Soviet
Union into a Russian nation-state.”31 The Affirmative Action Empire was an
important contribution to the western understanding of the Russian relationship
with Islam in that Martin’s thesis challenged a long-standing scholarly
interpretation of Soviet behavior in Central Asia. In Soviet Empire: The Turks of
Central Asia and Stalinism (1967), Olaf Caroe presents a much more cynical
portrayal of Soviet nationalities policy. The book has no footnotes and draws
overwhelmingly from secondary sources, but it is nevertheless a well-argued
example of the “divide and rule” thesis of Soviet nationalities policy towards the
Muslims, which Martin denies. Caroe portrays nationalities policy and other
29
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facets of the Soviet Union’s relationship with its Muslims as a scheme to ensure
ethnic conflict, political disenfranchisement, and a state of perpetual dependence
on Soviet power. He describes the Russian partition of Central Asia as
“cantonization, conceived with the object of working against any conception of
the unity of the eastern Turks and bringing the disjecta membera under the
influence of overwhelming forces of assimilation from without.”32 He credits this
characterization largely to Zeki Velidi Togan, a Turkic nationalist who fought
against the Bolsheviks in Central Asia during the Russian Civil War. To Caroe,
Togan’s first-hand experience with Soviet rule gives him an enhanced degree of
credibility.33
However, Togan’s personal antipathy to the Soviets presents an obvious
challenge to his scholarly objectivity. In Caroe’s chapter on nationalism and
colonial empire, he paraphrases Togan’s characterization of the political partition
of Central Asia:
The Russian object was first, under a cloak of separate race-consciousness,
to break down and weaken the natural ties joining the limbs of Turkestan,
and then to bring each severed part not into relation with other parts but
into subjection to the outside force, Russia.34
This passage clearly insinuates that the Soviet insistence on ethnic particularism
was a Machiavellian strategy designed to neutralize any national unity in Central
Asia. Caroe’s language also portrays the Soviets as devious (“a cloak of separate
race-consciousness”) and almost grotesque (“each severed part” of “the limbs of
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Turkestan”). Caroe also demonstrates a tendency for dramatic metaphor at other
points in the book, describing the consolidation of Soviet power as an apocalyptic
flood35 and concluding his book with a plea for “the burning spirit of a light at the
heart of a people.”36
By the end of the Brezhnev era, those Muslim Central Asian identities
became increasingly worrisome to a Soviet leadership hoping to maintain power
and legitimacy after eighteen years of political and economic stagnation. Michael
Rywkin’s book Moscow’s Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (1982)
discusses the status of Central Asian nationalism at the beginning of what would
be the death throes of Soviet power. The book is a collection of essays giving
historical, economic, and sociological context for the issues facing late-Soviet
Central Asia. It is also a more specific treatment of how Islam affected the rise of
nationalism in a Muslim region of the Soviet Union. While the book does focus
on this situation in Central Asia, the issues it addresses are pertinent to the other
Muslim regions of the USSR as well. Throughout the book, Rywkin emphasizes
that Islam had a direct and profound affect on nearly every aspect of public and
private life in Soviet Central Asia. It is the “indispensable ingredient” that colors
all facets of Muslim life in Central Asia.37 Chapter Six is titled “The NationalReligious Symbiosis” and is focused on explaining the relationship between Islam
and national sentiment in Soviet Central Asia. Rywkin argues that this
omnipresence of religion resulted in “a merging or overlapping of ethnic and
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religious sentiments and loyalties that reappears in all aspects of Central Asian
existence. It is this symbiosis that so frustrates Moscow in its attempts to
integrate the growing Central Asian masses into a common mold as part of the
‘Soviet people.’”38 The last sentence of this passage is significant in that it
assumes, contrary to Martin’s thesis, that “Moscow” (the Soviet government) did
indeed intend to integrate Muslim Central Asians into something more
homogeneous and culturally suitable for the Communist government.
Rywkin extends his concept of a national-religious symbiosis to the
personal level as well. He argues that Islam is a central and fundamental
component of Central Asians’ personal identity and that they cannot be non“Muslim” and nevertheless retain their identity as an Uzbek or a Tajik.39 If
Rywkin’s personal-level national/religious symbiosis is an accurate
characterization of how Central Asians perceived themselves, it indirectly
suggests that, in the early 1980s at least, Moscow was at once promoting two
mutually exclusive initiatives: the development of national consciousness and the
destruction of religion. Missing this important link between national, religious,
and personal identities, Soviet officials promoted initiatives that directly
countered each others’ possibilities of success.
Rywkin identifies another pair of self-defeating Soviet policies in a brief
discussion of the relationship between “the Muslim-based, modern, nationalist
spirit” and socioeconomic progress in Central Asia.40 This new Muslim
nationalism was “an unplanned by-product of Soviet nationality policy and a
38
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direct result of Soviet socioeconomic achievements in the area. Moscow is
learning that progress fosters nationalism instead of curtailing it.”41 While
Rywkin was not the first scholar to make this observation, he presents it clearly
and unequivocally. Soviet nationalities policy was based on the idea that by
granting the “forms of nationhood” – to include generating socioeconomic
progress – an ethnicity’s national identity would develop within, and only within,
the framework of the Soviet state and Marxist/Leninist ideology, thus preempting
the threat of nationalism. Rywkin’s thesis argues that this very progress, financed
and promoted by Moscow, would inevitably lead to the rise of nationalism and the
fracturing of the Soviet Union. The conclusion leaves Soviet leaders and theorists
with an unenviable historical legacy, as those who burdened the USSR in order to
support policies that would cause its premature demise. In the book’s conclusion,
after a discussion of various policy options in Central Asia, Rywkin offers a
specific and ominous prediction for the future of Soviet power in the region:
“whatever Moscow’s ultimate choice, Soviet Central Asia is bound to become its
number one internal occupation by the last decade of our century.”42 While the
collapse of the Soviet Union did not begin in Central Asia, and it barely lasted
into the last decade of the twentieth century, Rywkin’s book represents a through,
mature understanding of Muslim nationalism in the Soviet Union. Rywkin
emphasizes the significance of the Islam as a social identifier rather than as a
specific set of religious beliefs and practices. His book also emphasizes the
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significance of social progress in fermenting and strengthening nationalism in
Central Asia.
Published fourteen years earlier and at the beginning of the Brezhnev era,
Alexandre Bennigsen’s and Chantal LeMercier-Quelquejay’s Islam in the Soviet
Union comes to some of the same conclusions as Rywkin’s book. In their
conclusion, the authors suggest that “it is probable that the years ahead will put
the Muslims in the Soviet Union in the forefront of events.”43 Part IV of the book
is a discussion of the character of Russian Islam as it was during the mid- to late
1960s. Nationalism and national consciousness comprise a significant portion of
this discussion. Bennigsen and LeMercier-Quelquejay, like many of their
contemporaries, identify what was a strong and mutually strengthening
relationship between Islam and nationalism in the Muslim regions of the Soviet
Union. In their chapter on “Islam as a Religion,” the authors explain that Islam
survived as a strong and potent social identifier even among entirely secular
Soviet “Muslims.” At the conclusion of the chapter, they write that “above all,
Islam survives as a social bond of union which enables the Muslims to
differentiate themselves from the Russians.”44
A strong “social bond” is of course an important component of
nationalism, and the authors discuss in depth the face and future of Muslim
nationalism in the Soviet Union. Like many western historians of the 1960s, they
argue that Soviet nationalities policy was conceived with the ultimate goal of
achieving the cultural assimilation of the Muslims. Tellingly, chapter fourteen of
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Islam in the Soviet Union is titled “The Problem of National Consciousness,”
suggesting that Muslim national self-awareness was indeed a challenge to the
Soviet state.45 At the beginning of this chapter they present a spectrum of
possible minimum and maximum objectives of Soviet nationalities policy, the
“maximum, ultimate objective” being “the merging… of the various nationalities
of the Union into a single ‘Soviet nation.’”46 However, in their conclusion to the
chapter, Bennigsen and LeMercier-Quelquejay present a conventionally
pragmatic assessment of Soviet attitudes toward Muslim national consciousness,
explaining that “it is approved when it can be played off against pan-Turkic or
pan-Islamic consciousness, but it is stigmatized when it runs counter to Soviet
supranational patriotism.”47 The authors’ analysis is in part a variation of the
classic divide-and-rule thesis, in that they portray individual Muslim ethnicities’
sense of identity as a focus of loyalty that the Soviet government hoped to utilize
to trump larger, more politically hazardous identities.
The majority of Tribal Nation is in part a response to the two predominant
western portrayals of Soviet nationalities policy: that it was either a cynical
“divide-and-rule” stratagem (most thoroughly argued by Richard Pipes and Olaf
Caroe), or that it was a genuine attempt at nation-making (argued more recently
by Yuri Slezkine and Terry Martin). At the beginning of her book, Edgar makes
the important point that a Central Asian nation created by Soviet policy is a nation
nonetheless, noting that most nations are at least in part the product of some
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political process.48 This concept is a point which is also emphasized by other
historians, not the least of them Alexandre Bennigsen, who writes that Central
Asian national consciousness, “although originally artificial, is now tending to
become real.”49
Edgar’s chief criticism of both the divide-and-rule and the nation-making
theses is that they both assume that the resulting nations were overwhelmingly the
creation of Soviet policy-makers, ignoring or negating the role of Turkmen
culture and the Turkmen people themselves.50 Her thesis is that “the discourse of
Turkmen nationhood in the 1920s and 1930s was shaped in large measure by the
intersection of indigenous concepts of identity with the new understandings of
nationhood introduced by the Bolsheviks.”51 She therefore suggests that
Turkmenistan is a hybrid creation of Soviet policy and traditional culture.
Whereas challenging the divide-and-rule thesis is an important part of
Edgar’s book, it is the central focus of Anne Haugen’s The Establishment of
National Republics in Soviet Central Asia (2003). Haugen, a Norwegian historian
of Central Asia, re-examines aspects of the established scholarly consensus about
Soviet nationalities policy in Central Asia. Haugen argues that in creating the five
Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) in Central Asia, Soviet authorities were
genuinely attempting to bring together unnecessarily disjointed nations. She
explains that the Soviet authorities “perceived a deeply fragmented Central Asia,”
and that “the delimitation should be seen as an attempt to unite rather than break
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up the region.”52 This argument is a large component of her overall thesis and is a
departure from much of the historiography on Russian policy in Central Asia.
Haugen recognizes its contentious quality, and chapter four of her book is devoted
to this topic. An important component of her argument is that there is a distinct
break in the Soviet approach to Central Asia between the 1920s and the later
Stalinist era, that the ideas and strategy that guided the delimitation of Central
Asia were fundamentally different from that which guided Stalin’s consolidation
of power and the Great Terror in the late 1930s.53 Whereas political insecurity
caused Stalin to rely on terror in the 1930s, the Bolsheviks of the 1920s believed
that they could win the genuine support of the various nationalities. Part of her
objection to the divide and rule thesis is that in the framework of this idea, “the
notion of an ‘omnipotent regime’ and a ‘victimized population’ has been
central.”54 She doubts the accuracy of these characterizations, citing revisionist
portrayals of the Great Terror presented in a now discredited essay by J. Arch
Getty.55 Haugen’s certainty that the Soviets did not perceive a united Central
Asia is perhaps best illustrated in her discussion of the Soviet attitude and
response to the Basmachi revolts (1916-1931). Despite the Basmachi leaders’
vocal calls to Muslim and Turkic unity, Haugen doubts that the Soviets perceived
the insurgency to be a genuine Muslim nationalist challenge to Soviet rule:
In spite of the appearance of national slogans, they did not represent the
essence of the phenomenon. At least, that was the interpretations of the
Soviet authorities. However pragmatic and power-oriented the Soviet
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regime was, elements of Marxian thinking are here clearly present.
National and religious aspects were merely guises for the true, economic
nature of the Basmachi rebellion.56
The second major argument of her book is that indigenous Central Asian
elites played an important role themselves in the process of delimitation. These
elites “exerted considerable influence on important decisions of the Soviet
authorities.”57 In Haugen’s interpretation, the combination of the Soviet drive for
unity, the pre-national sources of identity, and the influence of local political
elites meant that the republics that emerged in Central Asia were to a large extent
accurate representations of nationhood in the region. “It is a main argument in
this study,” she writes, “that the nationalization of political discourse and
ultimately the entities that were established as a result of the delimitation process
to a great degree corresponded to historical divisions in Central Asia.”58 These
“historical divisions,” she acknowledges, did not exist in pre-colonial Central
Asia and did not begin to develop until the turn of the century with the appearance
of an indigenous Muslim intelligentsia. Reformist intellectuals, most notably the
Jadids, began to distinguish themselves apart from one another in terms of
nationality, based on language, ethnicity, and a sedentary vs. nomadic mode of
living. Haugen argues that the process of delimitation was guided by these
relatively new identities.59
Chapters six through eight of Haugen’s book examine how the process of
delimitation affected the development of Muslim nationalism and national
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identity in Central Asia. She argues that the Soviet partition of Central Asia
magnified the relevance of existing but insignificant conflicts among the
ethnicities of the region: “when the establishment of political entities based on
national affiliation appeared on the agenda, previously relatively unimportant
differences assumed heightened political significance.”60 Haugen provides
evidence for this assertion with the examples of the disputes that followed the
establishment of the Kazakh SSR, the Kyrgyz SSR, and the Karakalpak
Autonomous Oblast.61 These conflicts are important in her greater discussion of
nationalism in that they are manifestations of the idea that Muslim nationalism in
Central Asia was a hybrid of indigenous identity and Russian policy.
Recently, many scholars of the Russian relationship with Islam have, like
Haugen, focused on either the Tsarist era or on the early Soviet period.
Significantly fewer have focused on the same relationship in the postwar Soviet
Union. Yaacov Roi notes this trend in the introduction to his book Islam in the
Soviet Union: From the Second World War to Gorbachev (2000).62 The book is
in part an effort to fill this gap. Roi, an Israeli historian of Central Asia, traces the
history of Soviet Islam from World War II through the fall of the Soviet regime.
Due to the book’s considerable scope and length (764 pages), Roi is able to
thoroughly examine policy toward Soviet Muslims, their reaction toward that
policy, and indigenous social patterns. The last chapter, titled “Islam and
Nationalism,” examines how the Islamic religion and ethnic nationalism
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buttressed each other in the years leading up to the Soviet collapse. Roi illustrates
how in Soviet Central Asia and in other Muslim regions of the USSR, for much of
the population Islam remained more as an identity than a religion. This
distinction was particularly true for the Muslim intelligentsia. Ironically, the
educated classes in the Muslim republics were at once the most overtly secular
and the most strident defenders of Islam as an identity. Roi explains that
“although [the Muslim intelligentsia] had for the most part become alienated from
Islam as a faith… they genuinely perceived it as a necessary component of their
national culture.”63 The leading role of the Muslim intelligentsia in shaping
notions of national identity is also emphasized by Bennigsen and Carrère
d’Encausse, among others.
The idea that the intelligentsia protected Islam as a “necessary
component” of their culture is very similar to the “national-religious symbiosis”
expressed by Rywkin and others. Most of these writers emphasize that a lack of
overt Islamic religiosity did not diminish the power of Islam as a foundation of
national identity. Discussing the role of Islamic nationalism in the waning years
of the Soviet state, Roi writes that “it was only thanks to the fact that Islam and
national sentiment had had a symbiotic relationship… that their coincidence, or
collaboration, became so worrisome to the regime in the late 1980s.”64 Thus, we
are brought full circle. Roi is, in effect, portraying an imperial state concerned
about the same ingredients of Muslim identity as historians of the Tsarist era or
those of the early Soviet period. The idea of a “symbiotic relationship” between
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people, faith, and nation forms the foundation of the western historical
understanding of Muslim nationalism in the Russian and Soviet empires.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined how western scholars have understood the
history of Muslim nationalism in modern Russia. It has proposed that this
historiography can be best understood through a matrix of people, faith and
progress. Historical portrayals of Muslim nationalism in Russia and the Soviet
Union must begin with understanding the origin of the nation and national identity
in the Russian empire. Historians such as Wheeler assert that Central Asia was
entirely devoid of national identity in the years before the Russian conquest.
Scholars such as Edgar, Haugen, and others have attempted to understand the
social bonds and historical circumstances which formed the basis for the nations
that later emerged. They have argued that, while nations per se did not exist in
Central Asia before the Russians, many of the essential elements of national
identity did. They have argued moreover that the nations that emerged after
Stalin’s nation-building were not exclusively foreign creations, but rather hybrid
Soviet/indigenous entities. However, this emerging historiographical canon is
still small and will need to be further developed and argued if it is going to
replace the established scholarly consensus of Pipes, Conquest, and other Cold
War-era historians.
The same is true of the question of Soviet motivations for the partition of
Central Asia. On this question, the emerging consensus is larger and wellformed. The re-evaluation of Soviet nationalities policy broached by Slezkine in
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“The USSR as a Communal Apartment” has been continued and developed by
historians such as Terry Martin and others. This trend was recently noted in the
historiographical survey contained in Haugen’s The Establishment of National
Republics in Soviet Central Asia (2003). However, this new portrayal of Soviet
nationalities policy has its own flaws, chiefly that it fails to sufficiently emphasize
the persistent Soviet anxiety over pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideologies, and the
repressive measures used to fight these movements. The idea of a clear break
between Soviet intent and motivations of the Bolshevik Revolution and those of
the later Stalinist era is also flawed in many respects, not the least of which is that
Stalin himself was the chief architect of nationalities policy during the
revolutionary era.
Thus far, this thesis has surveyed the historiography on Russian and Soviet
policy toward their Muslims, and on the development of Muslim nationalism and
national identity. The next chapter will examine how Western scholars have
perceived the interaction and, in some cases, conflict between these two forces.
First and foremost will be the various reform movements, the Jadids at the turn of
the century and the Sultangalievists in the 1920s. Equally important will be the
overt assaults on Russian power, chiefly the Kyrgyz Basmachi revolts. It will
also analyze some special themes in the historiography of the Russian relationship
with Islam, including the issue of the cotton economy and the growing
historiography on the conflicts between Russian and Muslim attitudes towards
gender.
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CHAPTER THREE
CHARACTERIZING CONFLICT: COTTON, REBELLION, AND WOMEN
In attempting to understand the relationship between two powerful
entities, historians typically analyze a specific conflict or series of conflicts as
case studies to better understand the power dynamics of that relationship. At the
intersection of Russian policy and Muslim response, historians have identified
cotton cultivation in Central Asia and Soviet gender equality initiatives as a pair
of conflicts that are uniquely well-suited to understanding the power dynamics of
the Russian relationship with Islam. They have also utilized various approaches
to understanding these responses. Early treatments of cotton cultivation, for
example, tend to examine the issue almost exclusively from the Russian and
Soviet perspective, focusing on agricultural policy and its comparative successes
and failures. More recent treatments of the issue tend to focus on how cotton
cultivation affected the peoples of Central Asia. This trend also holds true for
studies of Soviet gender-equality initiatives. Earlier studies, such as Gregory
Massell’s The Surrogate Proletariat (1974), examine how gender reform fit into a
larger Soviet strategy to consolidate power among the Muslim peoples of Central
Asia. Later studies center on how these efforts affected Central Asian societies
and Muslim women themselves. This chapter will trace the scholarly shift from
Russian policy to Muslim agency in histories of cotton cultivation and gender
policy, and examine how these issues themselves have impacted the scholarly
understanding of the Russian relationship with Islam as a whole. The Basmachi

revolts, armed rebellions against Tsarist and later Soviet authority during the
revolutionary and early Soviet era, stand out as series of conflicts that have the
potential to add to the scholarly understanding of the early Soviet approach to
Muslim resistance. However, compared with the degree of scholarly attention
given to the cotton economy and gender policy, they have been largely neglected
by the scholarly community, despite being perhaps the most significant threat to
Moscow’s power in the early Soviet period.
I. Cotton & Colonialism
Perhaps no aspect of the Tsarist or Soviet presence in Central Asia was
more explicitly “colonial” in nature than the institutions, policies, and politics
surrounding cotton production. Cotton, first grown in Central Asia to alleviate
shortages caused by the Union blockade of Confederate cotton during the
American Civil War, quickly became the chief Russian economic interest in
Central Asia. The cotton economy also endured, albeit in drastically different
form, from the Tsarist conquest of Central Asia until the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Consequently, it has attracted much attention from scholars. Many have
used it as a case study to understand the basis of the economic relationship
between Russia and Islam, and more specifically whether these ties were
exploitative or mutually beneficial.
The first scholarly treatments of Central Asian cotton cultivation are
largely unconcerned with the industry’s effect on Muslim societies, focusing
rather on cotton’s role in motivating and spurring the initial Russian conquest of
the region. This issue is at the forefront of Seymour Becker’s discussion of cotton
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cultivation in Central Asia in Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 1865-1924
(1968). In his book, Becker emphasizes the importance of cotton to Russia’s
burgeoning nineteenth-century textile industry, but cautions against historical
interpretations that implicate cotton – or any economic incentive – as the sole or
even primary motivator for the Russian conquest of Central Asia. Instead, as we
have seen, he argues that the invasion was spurred by a variety of strategic,
political, and economic motives.1 “Although Central Asian cotton had acquired a
new importance for Russia on the eve of conquest, and considerable sentiment
existed for an advance into Central Asia to protect and promote Russian
manufacturing and trading interests,” Becker writes, “the influence of these
factors on policy-making was minimal.”2 He further finds that Russian reliance
on and interest in Central Asian cotton was inversely related to the availability of
cotton elsewhere. The two greatest stimuli to Central Asian cotton production
were foreign wars – the American Civil War and the First World War – which
disrupted Russia’s supply of American and Egyptian cotton.3
The focus on the Russian side of the cotton trade is also evident in John
Whitman’s 1956 article “Turkestan Cotton in Imperial Russia.” The article traces
the development of cotton cultivation in Central Asia, from the primitive, laborintensive and small-scale methods of the early nineteenth century to the largescale, industrial-style production that became characteristic shortly before the
1917 Revolution. While Whitman examines Russia’s technological and
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methodological improvements in cotton cultivation in Central Asia, the article is
decidedly a history of the economic development of the region and its people.
Whitman argues that cotton, more so than any other Russian innovation in
Turkestan, was responsible for transitioning Turkestan from a traditional agrarian
economy to a modern, capitalist one.4 He is careful to point out that Russian
“cotton policy” in the region was not designed to directly enrich the Tsarist
government but rather to create political and economic conditions favorable to
private Russian companies and entrepreneurs. Infrastructure projects such as the
Trans-Caspian Railroad and irrigation, financed by the Tsarist government, served
to make Turkestan a more favorable environment for Russian investment in
cotton cultivation.5 Vibrant private enterprise in the region would solidify
Russian power and justify the costs of administration.
Whitman’s article discusses Central Asia exclusively in terms of how the
cotton economy impacted its relationship with Russia and vice-versa. David
MacKenzie’s 1974 article “Turkestan’s Significance to Russia (1850-1917)”
examines the broader nature of Central Asia’s relevance to the Russian empire
and how it changed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. He discusses
Russia’s strategic, political and economic interests in the region and attempts to
understand how they each shaped and influenced Russian policy in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. By the late nineteenth century, cotton
was, MacKenzie contends, overwhelmingly Russia’s chief economic interest in
Central Asia. By 1910, he writes, the Tsarist government “regarded Turkestan as
4
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a giant cotton farm.”6 However, he also argues that, in the middle of the
nineteenth century, the Tsarist government was less concerned with acquiring a
domestic cotton farm than it was with countering the growing British strategic and
military presence in the region. He suggests that cotton gained real significance
in Central Asia only after the Tsarist government sought to counter a domestic
perception that the region was an unproductive drain on Imperial resources after
the geopolitical threat posed by Britain began to dissolve. The capitalization of
Central Asia worked. “By 1914 Turkestan was paving its way,” MacKenzie
writes, “bringing Russia strategic and economic benefits far exceeding the costs
of conquest and administration.”7 MacKenzie concurs with Becker in part in that
both historians deny that cotton or any other economic incentive was at the heart
of the Russian decision to conquer Central Asia. However, MacKenzie portrays
cotton as a commodity that quickly gained relevance in the policy-making
process, whereas Becker posits that the crop remained on the second tier of
concerns for Russian imperial policy in the region.
Though their portrayals vary, MacKenzie, Whitman, and Becker all
discuss cotton as a commodity around which Russian economic policy was or was
not formulated. They disagree on the significance of the crop to Russian policy.
In Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism, Olaf Caroe presents
cotton not as the subject of Russian policy but as a means of creating and
enforcing a specific economic relationship. In his discussion of pre-Soviet
Central Asia, Caroe argues that the Tsarist regime encouraged the creation of a
6
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single-crop agricultural system in order to reinforce Central Asian dependence on
the greater Russian economy.8 If Central Asians devoted a sufficient portion of
their agricultural resources to a cash crop such as cotton while neglecting grain,
they would be dependent on Russia and other parts of the empire for food. “It
was not only cotton that the Russians needed,” he writes; “they sought to impose
a measure of economic dependence.”9 Explaining why St. Petersburg encouraged
Central Asians to cultivate cotton in lieu of grains, Caroe writes that “this policy
could not fail to set Turkestan in economic tutelage to Russia in the elementary
matter of food supply.”10 This interpretation of the cotton economy presents the
interaction between Imperial Russia and its Muslim subjects as a distinctly
cynical, adversarial relationship. Russia used Central Asian cotton not only to
fuel its burgeoning industrial economy, but also as a tool with which to ensure the
region’s dependence on and subjugation to the Empire.
The idea that Russia deliberately used cotton to ensure the economic and
political subjugation of Muslims is a plausible but debatable historical argument.
Far more well-established is the assertion that cotton transformed Central Asian
economic life permanently and irrevocably. As Whitman suggests, the
development of large-scale cotton cultivation in Central Asia was a major factor
in bringing a modern capitalist economy to a largely traditional, agrarian society.
This thesis is advanced by scholars writing on the early economic history of
Russian Central Asia, most notably Hélène Carrère d’Encausse. More so than
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other scholars of the 1960s, Carrère d’Encausse examines how the advent of the
Imperial Russian cotton economy affected the way of life in Central Asia. In her
section on “The Social Consequences of Capitalist Penetration,” she explains how
Central Asians were wholly unprepared for the social and economic implications
of modern finances.11 As her book is focused more specifically on the Islamic
religion than on Central Asia in general, the author explains how Islam’s
prohibitions against money lending contributed to native Muslims’ naiveté
regarding the Russian credit system.12 Uninitiated into the realities of modern
financial credit schemes, Central Asian Muslims were quickly trapped in an
exploitative cycle of debt and poverty, disrupting lives and fueling resentment
against the Russians. It was this resentment and frustration, Carrère d’Encausse
explains, that led to the banditry and rebellion of the period.13 However, as credit
and the cotton economy ruined the peasants, it benefited merchants and even
created a social class previously non-existent in Turkestan: the intelligentsia. “At
the same time that the appearance of capitalism in Bukhara brought with it a
tragic crisis for the peasantry, and to a lesser degree the artisans,” she writes,
“there was a corollary social phenomenon: the development of a national
bourgeoisie.”14
However, on balance, the “tragic crisis” of the peasantry was probably the
more significant social phenomenon, and the one on which the Bolsheviks were
later able to capitalize. Whitman makes this point in the conclusion of “Turkestan
11
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Cotton in Imperial Russia”: regarding the economic disenfranchisement of the
Central Asian peasantry caused by the Russian cotton economy, “from the Soviet
standpoint there was only one encouraging aspect: the native population was
exhausted and in misery, willing to accept any system which promised order,
peace, and a chance at survival.” 15
For many Central Asian Muslims, that chance at survival did not come
until well after the Bolsheviks had securely consolidated their power in the
region. As Ian Murray Matley explains in his essay on agriculture in Central
Asia: A Century of Russian Rule, the First World War and the 1917 Revolution
disrupted the Russian grain supply upon which Central Asia had relied during the
late Tsarist era. The war in Europe, the Revolution, and the Basmachi revolts all
combined to produce a drastic decrease in agricultural production in Central Asia,
both of cotton and the remaining indigenous grain production.16 While the
Bolsheviks did eventually bring a degree of order and peace to Central Asia,
cotton nevertheless remained a central aspect of Russia’s relationship with Central
Asia and its people. Cotton was one of Central Asia’s main contributions to the
Soviet centralized command economy. As MacKenzie points out, Imperial
Russia built much of the infrastructure that would allow the early Soviets to
capitalize on Turkestan’s inclusion in the USSR.17 Indeed, Matley notes that one
of the Bolsheviks’ first agricultural initiatives in Central Asia was to halt the
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reversion of cotton fields to grain cultivation that had begun during the chaos of
Revolution.18
As is consistent with many aspects of the scholarly discussion on the
Russian relationship with Islam, one of the chief questions regarding the early
Soviet cotton economy is this: Marxist/Leninist ideology notwithstanding, how
much did the Soviet cotton economy fundamentally differ from that of its
predecessor? The general consensus on this question is that there was a direct and
deliberate continuation of Tsarist cotton and broader economic policies toward the
Muslim regions of the newly-formed Soviet Union. In The Modern History of
Soviet Central Asia (1964), Geoffrey Wheeler presents Central Asia in a distinctly
subservient and secondary economic situation in the years after the 1917
Revolution, writing that “the Soviet Government now concentrated on what it
conceived to be its primary task of bringing Central Asia back to its pre-War
function as a source of technical crops and raw materials for the industries of
Great Russia.”19 During the years immediately following the Revolution, Soviet
authorities were more concerned with restoring agricultural and economic output
than they were with collectivization, and tolerated private enterprise at some level
until large-scale production had been restored.20 The agricultural policy followed
in Central Asia during the immediate post-revolutionary years was largely
consistent with that for the rest of the Soviet Union.
Wheeler’s portrayal of the Soviet cotton economy in his book is in line
with his treatment of Soviet economic policy in many of his other works,
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emphasizing the strategic and political motivation for Soviet policies in Central
Asia. In a 1955 article published in International Affairs, Wheeler postulated that
“the primary object of Soviet policy in Central Asia is to raise the productivity
and economic potential of a region which is not only rich in natural resources but
is also relatively remote from Western striking power.”21 Wheeler’s emphasis on
the strategic importance of Central Asia is perhaps influenced by the fact that he
was a professional soldier in the British Army, and would perhaps be more
cognizant of the military utility of the Soviet Union’s economic resources.
The history of early Soviet cotton policy is closely wedded to the broader
history of agricultural collectivization.22 Collectivization – the process of
violently and coercively transferring land, livestock, and other property from
private to state ownership – was a very contentious issue and is often
characterized as one of the first significant tests of Soviet power after the
Bolshevik Revolution. Adrienne Edgar discusses the Soviet rationale and
challenges surrounding collectivization of the cotton economy in Turkmenistan in
her book Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (2004). Chapter
Seven of Tribal Nation, titled “Cotton and Collectivization,” addresses Soviet
efforts to collectivize Turkmen agriculture and the resistance and revolts which
this initiative spawned.23
In the chapter, Edgar explains, like Wheeler, that the Soviet state put off
attempts at large-scale agricultural transformation in Central Asia until after its
21
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power in the region was more secure. Soviet agricultural policy involved not only
collectivization, but also centrally-directed production, guided by the Communist
theory that the new Soviet state could capitalize on massive economies of scale by
devoting entire geographical regions to the production of a single crop – in
Central Asia’s case, cotton. However, Edgar explains, this strategy forced the
Bolsheviks to commit one of the sins they had accused the Tsarist state of
committing: depriving nationalities of their right to national self-determination.
“Thus, despite the Bolsheviks’ harsh criticism of the Tsarist regime for turning
Central Asia into a ‘cotton colony,’” Edgar writes, “Soviet economic interests
ultimately forced the same role on Central Asia.”24
II. Revolts
Cotton in particular and economic policies in general were clearly
contentious policy issues for both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes, and they figured
significantly in the popular revolts which challenged the authority of those
governments in Central Asia. During the early twentieth century, decades after
the Tsarist regime had consolidated its control of the region, a series of rebellions
in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and elsewhere threatened the hegemony of the
Imperial government in those regions. The most significant rebellion to occur in
Central Asia during the Tsarist era was the Revolt of 1916, which was centered in,
but not limited to, the Fergana Valley and modern-day Uzbekistan. The first
English-language publication to discuss the rebellion in depth was Edward Dennis
Sokol’s The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (1954). In his introduction,
Sokol suggests that the topic had been neglected by western scholars. Having
24
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occurred during an especially tumultuous time in Russian and world history, the
revolt essentially competes for scholarly attention with the First World War and
the Bolshevik Revolution.25
Sokol himself argues that the rebellion was the cumulative result of
Muslim resentment against foreign rule and Tsarist mismanagement, involving
political, social, and economic factors. In his introduction, Sokol frames the
conflict in racial and religious terms, writing that the rebellion “provides an
elementary expression of that revolt of Asia against the rule of the white man
which is occupying so much of our attention presently. A close corollary to this is
the age-long struggle of Islam against the infidel; this also finds expression in the
revolt of 1916.”26 Sokol’s reference to an “age-long struggle against the infidel”
suggests that the rebellion was, in part at least, a manifestation of a broad and
continuing struggle against those whom Muslims perceived as the enemies of
their faith. While this idea may find parallels in contemporary conflicts, the
“revolt of Asia against the rule of the white man” is almost certainly a reference
to the French, British, and Dutch colonial conflicts of the 1950s.
Despite the importance which he assigns to religious and racial aspects of
the conflict, Sokol argues that the economic disenfranchisement of Muslim
Central Asians was the casus belli of the rebellion. He writes that “in few
revolts… does the economic factor play so conspicuous a role as in the Revolt of
1916.”27 Sokol, as would many scholars after him, emphasizes the plight of the

25

Edward Dennis Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1954), 13.
26
Ibid., 14.
27
Ibid., 21.

90

Central Asian peasant in the economic upheaval caused by the advent of the
cotton economy, the credit system, and competition for employment from the
influx of Russian unskilled labor.28 The revolt failed, in his estimation, because
of overwhelming Russian military superiority, but also due to a lack of
coordination and leadership on the part of the rebels.
Throughout his book Sokol is generally sympathetic to the rebellion. He
describes the Tsarist conquest of Central Asia as part of “the great expansion of
the West at the expense of Islam”29 and takes note of a double standard applied to
Christian and Muslim religious fighters.30 Sokol believes that the revolt is
evidence that the Russians failed in their civilizing task in Central Asia. In their
more than half century of rule in the region, the Tsarist government “effected no
significant influence intellectually or culturally upon Asia.”31 The ultimate reason
for their failure had to do not with any specific resistance or intransigence on the
part of the Muslims, but rather with Tsarist Russia’s own stage of development.
He expresses his opinion on this subject through the words of another historian,
Hans Kohn, who wrote that “the Russian Tsarist regime was itself far too Asiatic
to be able to influence Asia.”32 Kohn and Sokol are essentially suggesting that
Russian culture was too far removed from the main current of Western
civilization to make any appreciable contribution to modernizing the peoples of
Central Asia.
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The suppression of the revolt of 1916 would not bring peace to Central
Asia. Although the February and October 1917 revolutions were largely Russian
affairs, the Civil War would quickly spill over into Central Asia and intimately
affect its people. As soon as Bolshevik forces began to make headway in the
region, they were confronted with a series of native rebellions known as the
Basmachi revolts. These revolts continued after the defeat of the Tsarist forces
and comprised the greatest challenge to Soviet power in Central Asia during the
formative years of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as is the case with the Revolt
of 1916, the Basmachi rebellion has received relatively little attention from
western scholars.
The most serious scholarly attention the rebellion received during the
otherwise prolific 1960s was a chapter in Olaf Caroe’s Soviet Empire: The Turks
of Central Asia and Stalinism (1967). The chapter is a brief survey of the revolt
from the Russian Civil War to its final defeat in the late 1920s. To Caroe, the
Basmachi rebellion represented both specific policy grievances and a broader
desire for national self determination. He explains that the rebellion was
a movement of double inspiration. It was on the one hand a
revulsion on the part of the supporters of the old governments…
and on the other a more idealistic struggle for national freedom,
giving expression to the aspirations of the educated and ignited by
conditions of famine and horror which threatened to deprive all of
everything they knew, material and spiritual.33
The aspirations of the educated, namely the Young Bukharan reformers, however,
were not synonymous with the goals of many of the rural, uneducated Basmachi
fighters. While the Civil War period created the conditions necessary for unlikely
33
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partnerships, it did not foster the development of stable, durable alliances. There
was an inherent tension between the Jadid-inspired urban intellectuals and the
agrarian, rural component of the movement.34 This tension was one of the chief
challenges of the Basmachi movement, and one that Caroe identifies as an
important reason for its failure.
The next major western work on the Basmachi revolts is Martha Brill
Olcott’s article titled “The Basmachi or Freemen’s Revolt in Turkestan, 19181924” (1981).35 Olcott is aware of the dearth of western scholarship on the
subject, and she makes note of it at the beginning of her article. Indeed, in M.
Holdsworth’s 1952 article in Soviet Studies, “Soviet Central Asia, 1917-1940,”
published two years before Sokol’s book, the entire span of Soviet involvement in
Turkestan from the revolution to WWII is surveyed with hardly any reference to
the Basmachi revolt.36 In Alexandre Bennigsen’s Islam in the Soviet Union
(1967), the Basmachi movement is quite literally a footnote.37 Seymour Becker’s
Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia (1968) contains two pages about the revolt
and includes no specific discussion about the motivations for the rebellion or the
role of religion. In Tribal Nation, Edgar portrays the Basmachi in Turkmenistan
as a fractious collection of marauders, fanatics, and discontents. Arguing that the
rebellion was in large part motivated by Soviet cultural insensitivity and
oppressive economic policies, she does not discuss the rebellion as a genuine
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reflection of Central Asian identity.38 The one aspect of the rebellion on which
most of these authors agree is that it compelled the early Soviets to make social
and political concessions to establish order in the region. Part of the reason why
the Basmachi rebellions have received little scholarly attention is obvious: they
failed. By the early 1930s the movement was, with the exception of a few
isolated bands, largely defeated. However, Olcott takes issue with this rationale,
rather emphasizing the movement’s longevity, explaining that despite
overwhelming Russian military superiority, the Basmachi rebellions remained a
threat to Soviet power in Turkestan for most of the 1920s.39
She perceives the Basmachi rebellion as a religiously-driven conflict.
Indignant at what they perceived as an assault on their Islamic identity and way of
life, Muslims from across the social and economic spectrum of Central Asian
society united in rebellion against the atheist Soviet forces. “One cannot overemphasize the role of Islam,” she writes, “in the genesis and maintenance of the
Basmachi resistance.”40 Islam served as the unifying force of the resistance not
because its supporters were fanatically religious, but because it was so closely tied
to Central Asian identity. Olcott explains that Islam served to buttress together an
otherwise fractious and heterogeneous movement, writing that “all elements of
Turkestani society were agreed on one, and possibly only on, issue: Islam and
Turkestan were unquestionably linked. Even if the understanding of Islam was
varied, religion was a fundamental part of the self-identity of the Turkestanis.”41
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Here, Olcott presents the same portrayal of the role of Islam in Central Asian
society as she does in her 1987 book, The Kazakhs. Her argument is that,
regardless of the level of overt religiosity, Islam is a central component of
personal and collective identity for the peoples of Turkestan. This idea is
consistent with much of the Western scholarship on the topic of Muslim
nationalism in the region. The main thrust is that Islam retains its strength as a
source of identity for a people even in the absence of specifically Islamic behavior
and customs.
III. Gender
Conflict, cooperation, and co-optation in the Russian relationship with
Islam were not limited to the most direct realms of politics, economics, and
nationalism. Over the past thirty years, various historians have demonstrated that
competing perceptions of appropriate gender roles were also an important
component of the interaction between Islam and the Russian and Soviet states.
Earlier treatments of the Russian political and social relationship with Islam
usually contain very few references to the status of Muslim women in the Russian
empire or of Tsarist attempts to influence gender roles in Islamic regions of the
empire. For example, neither Richard Pierce’s Russian Central Asia nor Seymour
Becker’s Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia address the topic. The same
holds true of books written by Caroe, Carrère d’Encausse, and other 1950s- and
1960s-era historians of Islam in the Russian empire. These books reflect
scholarly trends of the time in that they do not regard gender, women, or families
as a noteworthy aspect of Tsarist or Soviet policy towards Islam.
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By most later accounts, the first and most significant conflict over gender
roles in Russian Central Asia occurred in the 1920s, with the Bolsheviks’ attempt
to cast women as a “surrogate proletariat” in lieu of sufficient class distinctions in
Russian Central Asia. The first and most exhaustive account of this phenomenon
is Gregory Massell’s study by the same name, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem
Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929 (1974).
The work was one of the earliest scholarly attempts at understanding the role of
gender in Soviet policy in Central Asia. While some scholars have challenged his
thesis, most recognize the significance of Massell’s book in suggesting gender as
a major category of analysis in the treatment of Soviet policy in Central Asia.
The book includes elements of gender, political, and legal history in its study of
the Soviet effort to foment sexual conflict and transform the place of Muslim
women in Central Asian society. However, Massell also uses gender conflict as a
lens through which to gauge the general feasibility of deliberate political efforts to
engineer social change in societies. He lays out his goals in the introduction to
The Surrogate Proletariat, explaining that he aims to understand “how, and to
what extent, political power may be deliberately used in the revolutionary
transformation of societies…; conversely, how, and to what extent, traditional
structures and life styles may serve as obstacles to engineered revolution.”42 In
this sense, the book is a sociological case study to understand a more general
social and political dynamic.
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Massell sees Soviet strategy as based on two central and flawed
assumptions, namely that “the key to undermining the traditional social order was
in the destruction of traditional family structures, and that the breakdown of the
kinship system itself could be achieved through the mobilization of women.”43 In
order to justify these very consequential initiatives, the Soviets had to illustrate
how Muslim women were subjugated and oppressed by the “traditional social
order.” Massell devotes an entire chapter to this effort, noting that the Soviets had
an obvious vested interest in highlighting the unpleasant aspects of female lives in
Central Asia. He writes that the Soviet perception of gender roles in the region
was viewed “through the spectacles of revolutionary elites frustrated by the
resistance and resilience of traditional society.” 44
This frustration caused the Soviet approach toward transforming gender to
be modified and adapted in fits and starts. An important theme of his study is that
Soviet gender policy in Central Asia was inconsistent and was guided more by
trial and error than by any set, static strategy. This theme is also discussed in his
introduction, where he writes that “the use of Moslem women affords an
understanding, on a special dimension, of the trial-and-error progression from one
revolutionary approach to another.”45 The idea of Soviet policy as being guided
by circumstance is actually consistent with recent interpretations of Soviet
history, which stress the importance of adaptation and pragmatism over rigid,
ideologically-driven policy formation.
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Massell concludes that the Soviet attempt to portray women as an
oppressed class was not successful. He explains that “women may be said to have
failed to function as a social class, a stratum with a shared sense of identity, with a
distinct, clearly perceived, community of experience, interest, purpose, and
action.”46 In short, women disappointed the Soviets, who at once sought to
liberate them and to use them as an oppressed class – a critical element necessary
for the creation of a Marxist/Leninist society in Central Asia. The core of this
“failure to function” as a stand-in proletariat was the fact that an identity – gender,
national, or religious – could not be translated for political convenience. Massell
explains that in their campaign to restructure and co-opt gender relations in
Central Asia, the Soviets found that “sexual identity could not readily serve as a
basis for class identity; sexual politics could not be reduced to class politics.”47
The Soviet effort to revolutionize gender relations – referred to in Central
Asia as the hujum, derived from the Arabic term for “attack” – involved many
aspects of women’s lives. This effort included securing women’s property rights,
ending the custom of female seclusion, increasing women’s and girls’ educational
opportunities, and reforming divorce laws. However, none of these efforts were
as publicly visible as the issue of the veil. The campaign against the veil was one
of the most contentious components of the hujum and is the focus of Douglas
Northrop’s Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia (2004). In
the book, Northrop examines the social and political consequences of the Soviet
campaign against the veiling of Muslim women in Uzbekistan during the 1920’s
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and 1930’s. The Bolsheviks saw the veil as symptomatic of the subservient
position of women in Uzbek society, and symbolic of social backwardness.48 A
large part of Northrop’s discussion of the campaign against the veil involves
determining the nature and extent of Soviet power in Central Asia. Northrop
argues that, while different from the Tsarist empire in many important respects,
the Soviet Union nevertheless behaved as a colonial power in Central Asia.49
In an article published in 1996 about the unveiling campaign, Northrop
explains that the Bolsheviks, frustrated by what they perceived as a lack of
conventional class distinctions in Uzbek society, instead substituted gender
equality as the primary arena of social progress. This understanding of Soviet
policy originated with Massell’s The Surrogate Proletariat, and Northrop
acknowledges Massell as a significant influence in his own work.50 Northrop’s
article expands upon this idea by exploring the unintended and harmful effects of
the hujum to the Soviet cause. Northrop explains that the all-out assault on
traditional Uzbek gender relations politicized Uzbek private life, inserted Soviet
authority into family relations, and consequently opened a new arena in which to
challenge Soviet rule.51 He presents the unveiling campaign as evidence of the
imperial nature of Soviet rule and the veil as an adopted symbol of resistance to it.
In his introduction, Northrop explains the political significance of the veil, writing
that “wearing a veil became more than a narrowly religious or moral matter; for
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many people it also became an act of political and national resistance to an
outside colonial power.”52 In effect, the Soviets inadvertently managed to
transform a mundane and routine manner of dress into a symbol of Muslim
independence and identity. While the veil did eventually fade away in Central
Asia, the hujum of the 1920s and 1930s nevertheless endured as an example of the
limits and inadvertent effects of Soviet power.
While the veil became a symbol of Muslim identity due to Soviet efforts,
there is no consensus among scholars that the Islamic religion was in fact the
primary source of identity in Central Asia during the early Soviet era. The most
enduring indigenous concept of identity, according to Adrienne Edgar, was the
individual’s tribe. More so than Islam, the tribe was the primary social institution
around which Turkmen society was organized. However, there were many
Turkmen cultural practices that derived as much from Islamic law as from
Turkmen culture. The most obvious and consequential of these was the place of
women in Turkmen society. Soviet authorities, as they did elsewhere in Soviet
Central Asia, embarked on a long and contentious struggle to restructure gender
roles in Turkmen society, and this initiative is the subject of Chapter Eight of
Edgar’s book, titled “Emancipation of the Unveiled.” Deciding where these
efforts should be directed was initially difficult for the Soviet Union because the
Turkmen were perceived as being less “oppressed” than their contemporaries
elsewhere in the Muslim world. Because they were neither veiled nor secluded –
due to the impracticality of these practices among a nomadic people – Soviet
gender activists focused their efforts on eradicating both female illiteracy and the
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payment of the bride-price. Both of these efforts met massive resistance within
Turkmen society. Much of Edgar’s discussion of gender in early Soviet
Turkmenistan centers on understanding the intent of Soviet policy and its ultimate
effect on the new Turkmen nation. Contrary to many other scholars of the
subject, she rejects the notion that Soviet gender policy was a simple, “colonial”style assault on Turkmen culture.53 Edgar argues that Soviet gender-reform
efforts were part of a genuine, concerted attempt to modernize and strengthen
Turkmen society. They failed because, having originated from and being directed
by Moscow, the Turkmen inevitably perceived the campaign as an effort to
undermine their native culture. Edgar concludes that “because the Soviet regime
carried the taint of alien rule, communist authorities were unable to persuade most
Turkmen that the emancipation of women was essential to their future as a
nation.”54
National resistance to an outside colonial power was certainly not unique
to the Bolshevik experience in Central Asia. Edgar’s article “Patriarchy and the
Nation: The Soviet ‘Emancipation’ of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic
Perspective” is an attempt to understand how the Soviet hujum in Central Asia
was fundamentally similar to or different from gender-reform efforts undertaken
by European colonial powers and by indigenous Muslim governments.55 Edgar
specifically examines French and British efforts in their Muslim colonies and
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Iranian, Turkish, and Afghan government initiatives in their own countries.56 In a
brief historiographical discussion of the idea of Soviet empire, Edgar notes that
many recent characterizations of the Soviet Union have portrayed the state as a
European empire in the classic sense of the term. Without rejecting the idea of
Soviet empire wholesale, Edgar proposes that the Soviet/Central Asian
relationship cannot be characterized as imperial without differentiating between
Soviet intent and Central Asian reaction. She argues that whereas the Central
Asian response to Soviet gender-reform efforts was characteristic of a colonial
state, Soviet motivations were not.57 While the early Soviets used much the same
language as Europeans in their condemnation of what they perceived as repressive
gender reform efforts in the Islamic world, their approach to transforming them
was fundamentally different. “If one considers state actions rather than rhetoric,”
Edgar writes, “it becomes clear that Soviet policy toward Muslim women in
Central Asia differed substantially from the policies of the French and the British
in the Middle East and North Africa.”58
These Soviet state actions included a sincere desire to elevate the status of
Muslim women and to include real investments in women’s and girls’ education,
literacy, and employment programs, as well as the campaign against the veil.59 In
these concerted initiatives to improve the lot of women, Edgar finds parallels with
indigenous gender reforms in Muslim states. However, she finds that Central
Asian Muslims reacted to these efforts in a manner typical of indigenous
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resistance to colonial-style oppression. Despite their best efforts, Russian Soviet
authorities were perceived as foreign, and their attempts to transform Central
Asian family and gender relations only caused these traditional relationships to be
perceived as vessels of resistance to foreign domination. Thus, traditional
relationships were reinforced and antipathy toward Soviet rule intensified.60
Edgar emphasizes that while national authorities in Muslim states may or may not
have been any more “native” than the people they governed, they were more
successful than the Soviets because they were perceived as such. Regardless of
the reality of distinctions of “foreignness,” Edgar explains, “it was the popular
impression of Moscow’s foreignness that mattered.”61
Edgar’s article, like many other studies of gender in the relationship
between Islam and the Soviet Union, examines the issue from the perspective of
the Soviet government or indigenous Muslim institutions. The Surrogate
Proletariat examines gender policy almost exclusively from the perspective of the
Soviet authorities, whereas Northrop focuses more on the involvement of local
reformers. In her book, The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and
Unveiling Under Communism (2006), Marianne Kamp examines Soviet gender
reform in the Muslim world from a largely heretofore unexamined perspective:
that of Muslim women. Drawing on oral interviews of Uzbek and Tatar women,
Kamp writes a history of the hujum from the perspective of those whom it most
affected. Consistent with much modern gender history, “agency” is an important
theme in Kamp’s book as she explains in her introduction, writing that “this is a

60
61

Ibid., 268.
Ibid., 269.

103

book about Uzbek women and is based on the words of Uzbek women. This is a
quest for agency in a context of coercion and limitation.”62 However, in her quest
for the agency of Uzbek women Kamp does not challenge the importance or
distinctiveness of Soviet policy. Rather, she suggests that the Soviet authorities
were the first government in Central Asia to expect or require participation from
Muslim women.63 She explains that “from the beginning of Bolshevik power in
Turkestan, citizenship was gendered, Party membership was gendered, and
expectations for citizenship participation were gendered.”64
Conclusion
Historians and other scholars have used the development of the cotton
economy, the Basmachi revolts, and Soviet gender initiatives as prisms through
which to view and understand the power dynamics of the relationship between
Russia and its Muslims. The continued existence and, indeed, the expansion of
the Central Asian cotton economy during the Soviet era is convincing historical
evidence that, in economic terms at least, the Soviet Union was a colonial power
on the model of its Tsarist predecessor. Not only did the Soviets exploit Central
Asia for economic gain, but, in mandating collectivization and the cultivation of
cotton and a sedentary, agrarian lifestyle, they also disrupted nearly all aspects of
traditional modes of living for Central Asia’s nomads. In this historical
framework, the Soviets become both economic and cultural imperialists,
effectively undermining many of the original justifications for Soviet power.
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The charge of cultural imperialism is one that the early Soviets are
particularly vulnerable to in regards to their gender policies as well. The history
of this subject gives scholars the opportunity to gauge how capable the young
Soviet government was at projecting power not only into public institutions, but
into more private identities – the family and, indeed, the self. In the growing
body of work on this subject, most historians have concluded that while the
Soviets did indeed manage to alter how Central Asians perceived gender, it
nevertheless demonstrated the limits of Soviet power and had negative unintended
consequences for the Soviet regime. Since notions of gender identity in Central
Asia are closely associated with the Islamic religion, studies of gender policy can
also serve as a historical case study through which to measure the effectiveness of
Soviet power against the influence of religious institutions.
Whereas historians have effectively used the cotton economy and gender
reform as historical tests with which to gauge the power dynamics of the
relationship between Russia and Islam, the Basmachi revolts have been largely
neglected in the English-language scholarship on the revolutionary and early
Soviet periods. In focusing too much on the rebellion’s fractious organization and
lack of central leadership, historians have been overly dismissive of the
movement. A more thorough examination of the Basmachi rebellion and its
legacy would likely add much perspective on the Russian response to Muslim
resistance and the Muslim reaction to foreign rule.
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CONCLUSION: THE BALANCE OF BURDEN AND BENEFIT
How have historians in the West perceived the Russian relationship with
the Muslims of Central Asia? Answering this question has been the central goal
of this thesis. It is a difficult question to answer in part because the topic flows so
seamlessly into other important topics in the history of Slavic and Islamic
civilization. The debate over Soviet nationalities policy, for example, clearly
includes the Muslim nationalities of the Soviet Union, but by no means is it an
exclusively Muslim issue. What begins as a thorough study of ideas and
perspectives on nationalities policy as it relates to Soviet Muslims can quickly
become a more general study on a much broader canon of work.
That said, we can identify a few distinctive trends in the study of this
specific topic, the Tsarist and Soviet relationship with Islam from the conquest of
Central Asia until the dissolution of the Soviet Union? First, the question of the
imperial nature of Soviet rule is and will continue to be the most contentious one
in the study of the Russian relationship with Islam. This trend can be partially
attributed to the fact that the historical legacy of the Soviet Union is still a
politically volatile issue in Europe and America. Characterizing the Soviet Union
as an imperial state both undermines one of the central foundations for its
existence and justifies Western efforts to contain the influence of the USSR
during the Cold War. However, it is nevertheless difficult to challenge the reality
that the Soviet Union was indeed an imperial state. The peoples of the Soviet
Socialist Republics (SSRs) had national self-determination only to the extent that
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the ethnically Russian-dominated Soviet central government allowed it. Even
seemingly inclusive policies such as korenizatsiia mainly served to dissuade
resentment at what was, essentially, subjugation by a foreign power.
The second trend is that there has been a general shift away from the
Soviet and Russian perspective and toward that of the Muslims. Earlier
treatments of the relationship between Russia and Islam tend to approach the issue
almost exclusively from a perspective of Russian policy. Tsarist administrators
and Soviet authorities were once portrayed as the primary agents of change and
power in Soviet Central Asia. The idea that the Muslims might have played a
more active role in this relationship – that they had “agency” – has developed
only gradually over the past twenty years. The concept of Muslim agency in the
relationship between Russia and Islam is consequential in that it challenges the
assumption that the Muslims were an entirely oppressed and subjugated minority.
The more control and self-determination the Muslims had in Tsarist and Soviet
institutions, the more responsible they become for how those institutions affected
their communities, both positively (widespread literacy, development of
infrastructure) and negatively (lack of civil rights, economic collapse). This new
emphasis on Muslim agency can be seen as an extension of the broader
historiographical trend toward post-colonial and subaltern studies. It can also be
understood as an example of a generational evolution of scholars’ interests,
wherein earlier historians of the topic studied the center and their intellectual
successors shifted their attention to the periphery.
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There has also been a decreased emphasis on the relevance of
governmental institutions themselves. Until recently, many scholars assumed that
official institutions were the primary power brokers in the relationship between
Russia and Islam. However, recent work on Soviet gender policy has
demonstrated that extra-governmental institutions such as the family and personal,
informal relationships may in some cases be as powerful, or even more powerful,
than the presiding government. This trend has supported the development of the
idea of Muslim agency in that it provides a solution for how Muslims could
control their own lives and communities while still being disenfranchised by
Tsarist or Soviet authorities.
Despite the large body of work on the Russian relationship with Islam,
there are nevertheless some significant gaps in our understanding of the topic.
The most significant of these relates in part to the continuing development of the
idea of Muslim agency. Western scholars have, for the most part, neglected
studying the role of the Muslim intelligentsia during the Soviet period. However,
most of the work on the Muslim intelligentsia has focused on the Jadid reformers
at the turn of the century or on the Sultangalievist Muslim communists. While
studies of these groups are significant, they do not go far enough toward
explaining the influence of Muslim intellectuals outside of these specific and
short-lived movements. Intellectuals are regarded as a key element in the
development of nationalism in studies of the topic in other regions of Imperial
Russia, Soviet Union, and elsewhere. In his book, Ethnic Nationalism and the
Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923 (2002),
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Aviel Roshwald demonstrates that intellectual elites consistently played an
integral role in shaping notions of national identity during and immediately after
the First World War.1 Many of the most notable Russian dissidents of the Soviet
era were academics and intellectuals, such as Andrei Sakharov and Roy
Medvedev. However, few scholars have explored the topic as it relates to the
Muslims of Central Asia. In writing this thesis, I originally intended to study the
role of the Muslim intelligentsia in the broader development of Muslim
nationalism. However, the idea soon proved unfeasible for a study of this scale,
because there was simply very little previous research on the subject outside of
the context of the Jadid and Sultangalievist movements. The closest scholars
have come to examining the role of Muslim intellectuals in the development of
Central Asian nationalism has been literature reviews of Soviet Muslim authors,
such as the Kyrgyz poet and novelist Chingiz Aitmatov.2 In order for historians
to have a more thorough understanding of Muslim nationalism, they must study
the society’s most prolific source of ideas and ideologies – the intellectual
dissident and non-dissident elite. It is likely that a more focused treatment of
Central Asian intellectual circles and academic establishments will add much to
our understanding of the development of Muslim nationalism in the Soviet Union.
In a trend related to the neglect of Muslim intellectuals, there is a parallel
neglect of Muslim dissent against the Soviet regime. Samizdat, underground
publishing of the dissident community, is regarded as a key component of
1
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resistance against the Soviet regime in Eastern Europe and in Russia itself. It is
also regarded as an important vehicle for the transmission of notions of ethnic and
religious nationalism in those regions as well. The Samizdat Register, a
compilation of translated samizdat writings smuggled into the West, is widely
regarded as an invaluable source on Russian dissidence against the Soviet regime.
However, the Register contains very little in the way of Muslim samizdat and
despite the marked interest in the development of Muslim nationalism in Central
Asia, there has been little inquiry into the samizdat of the region or other written
expressions of Muslim dissent. There seems to be a perception that the diffusion
of nationalism in Central Asia happened by some means apart from those that
were responsible for the trend in Russia and Eastern Europe. Future scholarly
inquiries into the development of Muslim nationalism in the Tsarist and Soviet
empires would do well to focus more intently on both the role of the Muslim
intelligentsia and the presence of samizdat in the Muslim republics of the Soviet
Union.
The most striking gap in the historiography of the Russian relationship
with Islam is the lack of studies of Central Asia in the years leading up to the
Soviet collapse. In the 1970s and early 1980s, there were a number of scholars
who predicted that the Muslims of Central Asia would soon become a major
destabilizing force in Soviet politics, demanding more autonomy and perhaps
even independence, severely challenging Soviet power. While the specific causes
of the Soviet collapse are still being debated, it was not initiated by a Muslim
revolt in Central Asia. While there were certainly unsettling ethnic disturbances
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in Central Asia during the years leading up to and immediately following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, they were, as a rule, not part of the sequence of
events which caused the collapse. In fact, while the Berlin Wall fell and the
streets were filled with demonstrators in the Baltic states, Central Asia took a
surprisingly passive role in the collapse of the Soviet empire. There is almost a
sense that some scholars were disappointed at the non-pivotal role that the
Muslims assumed in the final days of the Soviet Union.
Central Asia’s Muslims did not rise up in revolution to throw off the
Soviet yoke. Statues of Lenin and Marx were not toppled in Central Asian cities
the way they were in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, it was not until 2004
that the government of the Kyrgyz Republic removed the statue of Lenin from
Ala-Too square in Bishkek, quietly and with no ceremony, quite literally under
the cover of darkness. With such an anticlimactic end, how then can we best
characterize this span of the Russian relationship with Islam, from the Tsarist
conquest of Central Asia to the collapse of the Soviet Union? I propose that it
was a mutual relationship of burden and benefit.
Both the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes wanted to harness the vast
economic and strategic resources of Central Asia and its people. Many Central
Asians understood the benefits of such a partnership with a world power such as
Russia – security, commerce, infrastructure, and social progress. However, both
parties were saddled with significant burdens as well. The Tsars and the Soviets
were faced with an expensive empire and a people whose loyalty they were
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always unsure of. Both regimes felt compelled to transform aspects of Central
Asian society.
Revolts during the early Soviet era and the growth of nationalist sentiment
during the Brezhnev years, combined with Central Asia’s underwhelming
economic return, contributed to a general doubt as to whether Central Asia was, in
a sense, worth it. For their part, the Muslims of Central Asia, having benefited
from the modernization brought by the Russians, began increasingly to wonder
whether the advantages of Soviet rule were worth the continued denial of national
self-determination. Until 1991, the Soviet Union provided Central Asia with just
enough economic and security benefits to ward off the strengthening tide of
national discontent. When both parties decided that their respective burdens were
not, in fact, worth it, the relationship collapsed. Having brought an isolated and
undeveloped region of the world into modernity, Soviet power became obsolete in
Central Asia. Five independent nation-states were born and historians were left to
ponder a new and puzzling chapter in the history of ethnicity, faith, and empire.
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